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ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR DISARMAMENT

by

Frederic Walton Smith

Submitted to the
Faculty of the School of International Service
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree
of
MASTER OF ARTS

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AN ABSTRACT

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AN ABSTRACT

"Organization of the Government for Disarmament" is an attempt to present a description of the activities of the several departments and agencies of the United States Government involved in disarmament and arms control efforts. The paper attempts more than description, however, by noting a few of the organizational deficiencies that have accompanied U.S. disarmament efforts in the past and emphasizing those that, in the opinion of the writer, have not been adequately corrected in recent years. One purpose of the paper is to underline both the breadth of the disarmament organization and the extent of the role of the Department of Defense in making arms control policy. The disarmament research activities of the Government are examined in the paper, and it is found that research has been concentrated excessively on technical problems rather than political issues.

The study also notes that coordination among the various governmental organizations has been good generally, despite the clumsy apparatus. Supposedly "good" organization will not result necessarily in "good" disarmament policy.

PREFACE

> . . . I must stress that organization, machinery and competent people alone cannot guarantee the success of the mission of our country to prevent war, curb the arms race, and create lasting conditions of peace. But they can assure that the best effort of which we are capable is directed toward these ends.[1]

Disarmament as a philosophy and as an international political issue is the subject of more controversy and discussion today than ever before. Prior to World War II, disarmament was viewed not only as an attempt to lessen the dangers of war, but also as an economic measure to reduce the arms burden and devote the benefits gained to economic progress for all. As military science has evolved in the last fifteen years, however, disarmament has become linked with the survival of civilization, and the need for some form of international arms regulation has become more urgent than ever.

Because of the impact of modern military technology as well as the international political developments since the war, there has been a definite shift of emphasis in the philosophy of disarmament. From the historic concept of disarmament (or arms control) without inspection and control measures, disarmament efforts have tended to concentrate on increased international stability as a basis for various systems of arms control. This transformation in the policy of the government from that of disarmament in its historic sense was forcefully stated by Secretary of State Dulles in a radio and television address:

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[1] From a letter by John J. McCloy to President Kennedy, June 23, 1961, enclosing a draft of a bill "to establish a United States Disarmament Agency for World Peace and Security."

> Let me first of all make clear that we do not of course use the word "disarmament" in any literal sense. No one is thinking of disarming the United States or the Soviet Union or any other nation. What we are seeking is action, in the field of armaments, which will reduce the danger of war. It is imperative that we seek this result.[2]

Unfortunately, the government's collective position has not always been this clear, even at the time of the Secretary's statement. There have been occasional unintentional conflicts between our stated goal of disarmament (in its contemporary sense) and our military policy; divergencies of opinion within the government have been illuminated; and the efforts of the government to organize a disarmament program have often been either sporadic or half-hearted.

The impression has been gained, rightfully or otherwise, that the United States favors disarmament in its historic concept. Usually, however, members of the government who have talked of disarmament have actually been thinking in terms of arms control. Disarmament may be an ultimate goal in their thinking, but it is tempered by several basic political pre-conditions. The Soviet government has been uninhibited in its flat challenge for "general and complete disarmament within four years." This has been a very attractive argument that appeals to a war-weary and tension-tried world. It is extremely difficult for the U.S. Government either to accept or reject this position. Our attempts to gain the political advantages of the term disarmament while not fully espousing this position have produced only inconclusive and confusing results.

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[2] Department of State, Press Release 430, July 22, 1957, p. 1.

What is the significance of this lack of purpose and direction? Does it mean that the American people--and individual members of the government--do not have a disarmament philosophy, or have no faith in any form of disarmament? Or does it mean that there has been no sincere disarmament effort by the government? It means neither of these. Essentially, and this is the central theme of this paper, there has been no concentrated effort within the government to develop a sound disarmament philosophy that would serve as a basis for researchers, policy-makers, and negotiators. There has been extensive research for disarmament--or arms control--and lots of policy made in recent years, but much of it on an *ad hoc* basis designed to meet or counter the latest Soviet disarmament offensive. As a result, policies have occasionally appeared negative and designed more for propaganda than negotiation.

Although the volume of information on the general subject of disarmament is staggering, little effort has been devoted to a study of the nature of the governmental framework that produces disarmament policy. It is felt that this is an area that should not be neglected. Problems in the field of disarmament are *not* necessarily the same as any other issue of foreign policy. This was emphasized by Secretary of State Rusk in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on behalf of the proposed Disarmament Agency:

> Disarmament is a unique problem in the field of foreign affairs. I know of no other single matter in the international area that exceeds it in scope and breadth. It entails not only a complex of political issues, but involves a wealth of technical, scientific, and military problems which in many respects are outside the

Department's normal concerns and, in many instances, reach beyond the operational functions the Department is designed to handle.[3]

Disarmament is an emotional issue that is often enveloped in an aura of utopia on earth; at the same time, disarmament policy is an integral portion of our national security policy. How the Departments of State and Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and other agencies within the Executive Branch function in the area of arms control, and how this activity is inhibited or enhanced by the Congress, deserves considerable attention. Fundamental goals and objectives must be determined before effective policy can be formulated. These goals cannot be the product of one man, one agency, or even the product of only one branch of the government. It is reasonable to question whether past efforts have been satisfactory, and whether the present course is in the proper direction.

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[3] United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Disarmament Agency, Hearings on S. 2180, A Bill to Establish a United States Disarmament Agency for World Peace and Security, 87th Congress, 1st Session, August 14-16, 1961 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 15, hereafter cited as Senate Hearings on Disarmament Agency.

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CHAPTER I

SOME OF THE PROBLEMS OF DISARMAMENT

I. DISARMAMENT: URGENCY AND INERTIA

Ever since disarmament was first seriously considered by an international body (The Hague Conference of 1899) as a solution for some of the political and economic problems confronting man, it has been receiving increased attention from informed and concerned private citizens as well as the statesmen of the world. The quantity of human effort in the form of research, studies, conferences, and diplomacy seems to be closely correlated to the level of international tension and proportional to the capability of man to perfect methods with which to destroy himself. Much of this effort, both private and governmental, is the product of serious thought and fresh approach to the basic issues of disarmament. Without doubt, the deluge of literature in recent years devoted to the discussion of disarmament is sincere and reflects a genuine concern for the future of civilization. Nevertheless, in the rush to devise some way out of our present arms dilemma, disarmament has tended to become a popularized intellectual exercise as well as a legitimate political objective, and some of the literature that has dealt with the subject of disarmament has been stimulating intellectually but not too productive of fruitful public debate. It is not intended that any proposal is too frivolous, too complicated, or too divorced from what one person might consider reality to warrant serious consideration. After all, how far are we from reality when we contemplate

weapons such as the so-called neutron bomb, which--not too facetiously--might be called the ultimate in the "dirty" weapon?[1]

Despite this recent focus of attention on disarmament, no nation has indicated any urgent desire to disarm unilaterally. Although unilateral disarmament appeals to some segments of society, it would not necessarily result in reduced international tension. Voluntary or enforced accommodation among conflicting states would most likely be much more productive. Such accommodation might be realized within an international political order that is capable of restraining even the major powers, i.e., a system of "world government," or federation. Despite the attention this subject has received, and despite the welcome successes in the formation of regional organizations in recent years (primarily in the economic field), there is still no clearly defined political movement towards a supra-national organization capable of resolving great power disputes. Until such a system has become a reality, each nation feels compelled within the limitations of the present system to protect and advance its own interests, as it determines them. Customarily the use of force has been justified in the past as a legitimate means of settling international disputes when normal political and judicial procedures have failed. However, with the advent of

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[1] According to columnist Marquis Childs, the neutron bomb consists of ". . . hydrogen fusion set off without the trigger of an atomic explosion, which kills all life without causing physical destruction," "Fear is the Spur on Test Decision," The Washington Post, July 4, 1961, p. 12. It has not yet been demonstrated that such a weapon can be developed, although it is occasionally reported that both the United States and the Soviet Union are working on it.

today's weapons, some of which are almost indescribable in their destructive effects, war is being seriously challenged as a rational political act.

Thus we arrive at what may be considered the fundamental dilemma of the disarmament problem--the conflict between the effects of modern military science and the historic concept of national sovereignty, or the right of a state to use military force to defend itself. The frightening upward spiral of the destructive capability of the weapons that are devised seems to call for a major overhaul of the international political system, if this were possible. Yet, as we add to our arsenals and threaten each other with nuclear destruction, we are at the same time confronted with a quantitative strengthening of the only political institution that possesses the power to employ these weapons, the sovereign state. It is likely that the increased emphasis on national sovereignty, or the prerogatives of sovereignty, is detrimental to the development of an international political system capable of obviating warfare, or at least confining its destructive effect. Although there has been a trend toward regionalism, best exemplified by developments in Western Europe, the emphasis in this trend has been primarily economic and not as powerful as the growth of nationalism and sovereign integrity.

Sovereignty is inextricably involved with disarmament efforts. The Soviet Union is inherently opposed to any system of detailed inspection and control to support a disarmament program as being designed primarily to subvert her sovereign rights and provide access to her military secrets for "imperialist spies" in the guise of international inspectors. On the other hand, the extent to which the United States

would relinquish some measure of sovereignty in support of a comprehensive inspection and control system is justifiably subject to question, because the United States has not been effectively challenged. Both the U.S.S.R. and the United States, as well as most other nations, resolutely depend upon extensive armed forces as a protector of their sovereignty. Despite the urgency of the international situation, in which more destructive weapons are threatened with increasing regularity, the sense of urgency has not overcome the inertia of political sovereignty.

Some writers feel that the international community has already passed the "point of no return" for effective disarmament, and that "Rapid development of nuclear weapons with delivery missiles now makes adequate control impossible."[2] Whether this is a correct evaluation or not is not central to the issue at hand; U.S. disarmament efforts will undoubtedly be continued and increased, despite the fundamental conflict between the urgency of survival and the inertia of the political state system.

II. DISARMAMENT OR ARMS CONTROL?

Partly as a result of this clash between urgency and inertia, the philosophy of arms control has generally replaced that of disarmament in

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[2] Eugene Rabinowitch, "New Year's Thoughts," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 14:2, January, 1958. This writer feels that Mr. Rabinowitch clearly stated the essence of the disarmament dilemma in this brief article, when he noted that "The politicians had no sense of extreme urgency. Since 1945, the development of their ideas has been consistently behind the progress of weapons technology." Mr. Rabinowitch

the literary, educational, and governmental circles in the United States. This displacement is far from complete, for there is a body of opinion in this country (and an even more pronounced group abroad, especially in western Europe) which vehemently rejects the concept of arms control as a dangerous and irresponsible substitute for the true goal of world peace through disarmament. The two terms are not mutually exclusive or necessarily contradictory, however, as they are defined by most of the advocates of arms control today. It might be beneficial, therefore, to present briefly a few of the different definitive concepts without any attempt at detailed discussion, and with an intent to avoid the quicksand of the semantic argument over whether armaments themselves are a cause or symptom of international tension. For the purposes of the remainder of this paper, however, the terms disarmament and arms control will be used interchangeably.

Any study of the current concepts of disarmament will quickly illuminate a broad spectrum of views, from the historical definition of disarmament on the one hand, in which armed forces are reduced to that bare minimum consistent with internal security, to the more sophisticated definitions of arms control on the other hand, some of which propose even a strengthening of armed forces in various categories in order to provide a more stable international environment.

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continued that "For the time being, there are only two alternatives left: disarmament without effective controls, or acceptance of the state of 'mutual deterrence' as guarantee of peace - until a true world community has been created."

The adherents of "general and complete" disarmament are steadfast in their purpose and quite vocal in their demands. In the Western world, the disarmament advocates range all the way from the pacifist "ban the bomb" demonstrators to the more legalistic proponents of complete disarmament tied in with a form of world governments.[3] The proliferation and confusion of disarmament plans proposed in the Western world are not matched in the Soviet block, however, where the call is for general and complete disarmament within four years. This is not an innovation of Premier Khrushchev's; Litvinov was voicing the same challenge thirty years ago.[4]

The disarmament spectrum includes an indefinite number of variations of disarmament and arms control proposals. One of these is that arms control is merely a step leading toward disarmament, and that the concern of disarmament is:

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[3] Perhaps the most comprehensive and scholarly attempt to link disarmament with world government is the monumental effort of Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn, World Peace Through World Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958). Clark and Sohn present their concept of a detailed disarmament schedule in Annex I, pp. 203-299. Essentially, they call for a preparatory phase of two years in which an armament census would be taken and the political framework for international government would be established (including an international police force), followed by a ten-year disarmament schedule in which each nation will disarm ten per cent of its forces each year.

[4] A Litvinov speech in 1933 has a familiar ring today: "Speaking of disarmament, I permit myself to say here that the failure of the Geneva conference has still more strengthened us in the conviction that the only possible method of disarmament which would be not only effective but also practical and easily carried out is complete disarmament, the idea of which we shall continue to put forward at every convenient opportunity." Jane Degras (ed.), Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Volume III, 1933-1941 (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 43.

> . . . the actual reduction of arms and military forces and its goal, customarily, is the absolute elimination of all forces. Arms control is the direction of a country's military policy to reduce the likelihood and violence of war. Disarmament may be part of an arms control plan . . .[5]

Other concepts of arms control move even further away from the traditional goal of disarmament. Usually these definitions are expressed by the proponents of the theory of "stable deterrence," and include some small measure of international control of arms. One view is that:

> The notion of arms control recognizes that suitable schemes may be devised to reduce fear of surprise attack, to achieve greater stability, to lessen dangers of war, and that achievement of these goals may not involve large scale disarmament either at first or at all. The notion of arms control is larger than that of disarmament alone.[6]

The "stable deterrent" school has many advocates both inside and outside the government. It is this group that stresses the strong interrelationship between strategy and weapons systems, indicating that the latter now determines the former. The primary advantage of stable deterrence is that unilateral action can safely be taken to approach this goal, and that theoretically it is desirable for each side to progress as far as possible toward the possession of a stable deterrent military posture. Its principle disadvantage, this writer feels, is

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[5] Arthur T. Hadley, The Nation's Safety and Arms Control (New York: The Viking Press, 1961), p. 6.

[6] Amrom H. Katz, "Some Things to Think and Some to Do," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 17:142, April, 1961. In a companion piece in the same issue, Frank Bothwell stated in "The Initiative is Ours," p. 126, that "The fundamental problem of arms control is the achievement and stabilization of a strategic balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union."

that it does nothing to abate the arms race, and is severely limited to the current situation of what might be termed nuclear bi-polarity. Stability based upon mutual deterrence, without international inspection and control, would soon evaporate upon the appearance of a major nuclear "Nth power," such as Communist China. Ironically, the current trends of military strategy in the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. leading toward a degree of international stability coincide with estimates that Communist China will probably possess nuclear weapons in two or three years. International instability resulting from the possession of nuclear weapons by China will far more than offset any lessening of tension resulting from the more stable weapons systems employed in the future by the United States and the Soviet Union.

Perhaps the broadest definition of arms control--and thus the most difficult to employ effectively--is that:

> . . . "arms control" (comprises) the entire spectrum of possible arrangements - from armed "deterrence" schemes, which may require the building up of certain types of armaments, all the way to universal disarmament - with the common feature, however, that these arrangements are adopted as part of a conscious effort to decrease and eventually minimize the likelihood of uninhibited armed conflict.[7]

The difficulty is to determine which of these pegs the United States Government should hang its disarmament hat on. Should it select the internationally more popular--yet "idealistic"--goal of complete disarmament, or reach for something more "realistic" such as a more stable military posture vis-a-vis the Soviet Union?

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[7] Bernard T. Feld, "Inspection Techniques of Arms Control," in Donald G. Brennan (ed.), Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security (New York: George Braziller, 1961), pp. 317-318.

III. FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL GOALS

A brief discussion of the various views of disarmament and arms control suggests what is felt to be the most critical weakness of the organization of the government for disarmament: the determination of the fundamental political goals that is required before policy can be formulated. Within certain limitations, governmental agencies are able to develop disarmament positions for the negotiators to work with; technical advice on specific issues of military policy, weapons employment, nuclear test inspection, and other similar data, may be abundantly available in the various departments, but it would appear that nowhere is there an established institution or forum or committee whose function is the discussion and resolution of the basic political issues confronting the United States. Do the American people sincerely want disarmament? If so, is this considered a feasible political goal commensurate with our security at the present time, in the near future, or as a distant objective? And under what conditions will we accept the demobilization of our armed forces and the dismantling of the industrial complex designed to support these forces? Do the American people feel that disarmament is a realistic objective only after the establishment of a world order superior to the sovereign state system now in effect? Is such a world order--or world government--one of the fundamental goals of the United States? How much risk can our government accept in any agreement for arms control, when it seems evident that most Americans are convinced that "you can't trust the Russians," and "the only thing they respect is power." If these are valid interpretations of the

attitudes of Americans (without discussing their merit), is it sound political policy to state that disarmament is now our number one objective?

It is also questionable whether our government has been organized properly to resolve the legal, economic, and political implications of disarmament. These issues have not been fully presented to the nation. Does our Constitution--or federal law--require modification in order to permit the establishment of international inspection teams at critical control points throughout the country? What is the capability of our economy to absorb all or a portion of the immense defense-industrial activities into the non-defense sector of the economy within the course of a few years, if disarmament were to become a reality?

These rhetorical questions could be continued indefinitely, of course. They are indicative of the tremendous political and economic, as well as military, implications of disarmament. At the risk of being repetitive, it is suggested that these issues, or the product of their attempted resolution, represent what should be the foundation of United States disarmament policies and negotiating positions.

The need to determine and formulate basic goals in this area has been recognized and clearly defined by several authorities. One excellent treatment of this issue suggests that:

> In this jet-nuclear-missile age, nothing strikes a stronger chord of hope in the heart of man than the ideal of multilateral, effective and foolproof disarmament. Disarmament is a magic word, but perhaps not a very useful term. It is more realistic to speak of the limitation and control of arms rather than "disarmament," for an early elimination of national armaments down to the level needed only for internal domestic order seems out of the question. Another point to underscore is that

> armaments are a symptom rather than a cause of international differences, although it must be granted that growing military capability can inflame suspicion and distrust among nations. The assumption of U.S. strategic planners that the Soviet Union is actively prosecuting a program of ideological and territorial expansion in which the use of military force is always a possibility makes it extremely difficult to set in motion negotiations for some degree of disarmament. Military technology and the complex international political and economic situation make disarmament at once both more difficult and more desirable than ever before.[8]

IV. THE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS OF ARMS CONTROL

It is not the purpose here to present a comprehensive picture of what is generally called the technical problems or difficulties of arms control. There are several publications[9] that treat this question quite well; it is the intention rather to relate the problem of the resolution of technical issues of inspection and control to the decision-making or policy-making organization of the government.

Essentially, when any technical problem relating to arms control policy is studied in detail, the following typical question is posed: "How can the United States be assured of its national security if it accepts such a system of international inspection and control?" If the assumption is valid that there is no such thing as a foolproof control system, then it must be determined how much risk can be accepted in order to achieve a degree of arms control? No one would claim that the

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[8] Harvard Defense Policy Seminar, 1957-58, Volume 1, (Syllabus), "Disarmament: Alternative to the Arms Race?", p. 32.

[9] Seymour Melman (ed.), Inspection for Disarmament (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), although sketchy, is still the standard non-governmental reference for this subject. Other references are contained in the Bibliography.

present international situation does not entail risk for the United States. One may question how long this present risk or tension level can be tolerated, but this does not alter the fact that it is tolerated. No system of arms control should be considered beneficial if it would increase the chance of nuclear war, but perhaps there are programs acceptable to both disputing sides that would reduce the level or degree of risk. The art of devising an acceptable disarmament control system is based upon a comparison of the risk involved in international tension levels with the risk involved in the proposed disarmament system.[10] Whether consciously or not, the decision-maker who decides that a specific system of international control should be proposed or accepted by the U.S. Government is undertaking a calculation of risk acceptability.

For our purposes, then, the crux of the matter is whether the government is so structured as to be able to analyze the theory of arms control risk compared with the present risks of an uncontrolled arms race, and determine what arms control plan (if any) will best enhance the security of the United States. There are enough limitations inherent in any governmental decision-making process;[11] efforts of the

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[10] For a discussion of several of the ramifications of current military strategy, risk, and deterrence, combined with the "game theory," see Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), especially Chapter 10, "Surprise Attack and Disarmament," pp. 230-254.

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 201-3, "The Imperfect Process of Decision."

government should be directed toward maximizing the efficacy of the decision process in the disarmament field.

V. THE NTH COUNTRY

It has been suggested that perhaps the dominant theory of arms control in the United States is that of "stable deterrence." The essence of this theory is that both the Soviet Union and the United States, under the direction of "rational" political leaders, face each other with relatively invulnerable nuclear capabilities. In order for this theory to be effective, both countries must be aware of the strength of the other in order to eliminate the value of a pre-emptive, or first strike, attack. Not only must these forces be secure against attack, they must also be politically credible in order to deter the forces of the opposition. There is considerable merit to the claim that a "secure deterrent" lends itself to international stability. One study[12] develops as its central theme concerning an approach to arms control the notion that the United States in the past has concentrated too much effort in developing "soft" or "first-strike" weapons such as ready aircraft sitting at the end of runways, and poised missiles in unhardened sites. It is claimed that these weapons offer a tempting target, not only because of their military attraction to a potential enemy but because their employment and relative vulnerability indicate first-strike intentions. The thesis developed from this is that the United

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[12] Hadley, op. cit., pp. 15-20.

States should "harden" these weapons by dispersal, concrete protection, and other measures, and that these protective precautions will result in a more stable international climate.

Although this argument is not officially espoused by the Administration, it obviously is playing an extensive role in the military developments in the United States in the early 1960's. Many proponents of this theory tend to ignore the complications of what is popularly known as the problem of the Nth country. It is generally recognized that several nations, in addition to the present nuclear powers, are capable of developing their own atomic and nuclear weapons.[13] The big question mark among these nations is, of course, Communist China. Whether this troubled nation is interested in any form of arms control, with or without pressure from the Soviet Union, prior to becoming a major industrial-nuclear power, is subject to debate. From the U.S. point of view, a primary concern is the manner in which the problem of disarmament and Communist China is approached. Most U.S. efforts so far have tended officially to ignore the necessity of tying China into any comprehensive arms control agreement. This is certainly a vital political issue facing the United States, with many implications for foreign policy; yet, any discussion of Communist China is so charged with emotion that it is questionable whether any governmental change of organization could facilitate the resolution of this problem. Although

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[13] See W. Davidon, M. Kallestein, and C. Hohenemser, The Nth Country Problem and Arms Control (Washington: National Planning Association, 1960), pp. 27-28, in which three groups of potential nuclear powers are listed.

the United States Government has dealt with the Chinese Communist regime without diplomatic recognition, the Chinese would almost certainly state formal recognition as a pre-condition to joining the disarmament conference table. Satisfactory resolution of this problem is a fundamental requirement for an effective system of international arms control. It demands much more governmental attention and public debate.

There are several other facets to this problem of the spread of nuclear weapons to nations other than the four present nuclear powers. It has been suggested that the United States could be trapped by Soviet acceptance of a ban on nuclear tests because:

> . . . an agreement which involved the suspension of nuclear weapons tests with inspection and which did not include inspection in Communist China might present an opportunity for evasions on the part of the Soviet bloc.[14]

Ambivalence and vacillation have not characterized U.S. policy regarding sharing nuclear weapons with its allies. The policy since World War II has been to restrict the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear knowledge to non-nuclear powers. This policy enjoyed limited success for several years, but now that Great Britain and France have developed their own weapons there is increased clamor for limited sharing of nuclear weapons with U.S. allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).[15]

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[14] United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Control and Reduction of Armaments, Final Report of the Subcommittee on Disarmament, 85th Congress, 2d Session, Report No. 2501 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1958), pp. 5-6. This document is hereafter cited as Subcommittee on Disarmament, Armaments Control.

[15] Albert Wohlstetter, "Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N + 1 Country," Foreign Affairs, 39:355, April, 1961.

In the development of its policies, any government must strive to be as objective as possible regarding the motivations and values held by other nations. Perhaps this is especially true in the field of disarmament. One tendency, for example, is for Americans to equate Russian obsession for secrecy with an obstinate attempt on their part to antagonize the Western powers and impede efforts that might lead to world peace. Similarly, Americans may be guilty of misunderstanding the motivations of these "Nth" nations in their attempt to become nuclear powers, and tend to equate their drive for status and prestige with a reckless pursuit of irrational political objectives:

> Each new or prospective nuclear power thinks of the problem as that of stopping the next country after itself. This is the N-plus-1 country problem.
>
> As for world stability through arms control, France and England, for example, have tended to think of their own acquisition of nuclear weapons as entirely beneficial. Mr. Macmillan has justified British weapons and V-bombers on the grounds that they permit the English to exercise influence on arms control arrangements between the two major nuclear powers. General de Gaulle speaks of the increased effect on nuclear disarmament which France would have by becoming a nuclear power. In the limit, one might suppose that unanimity for nuclear disarmament may be achieved by distributing bombs to everybody.[16]

It could be a dangerous illusion on the part of the United States to believe in the rationality, not only of ourselves and our allies, but also the leaders of the Soviet Union. It is impossible to predict the actions of Premier Khrushchev--or any other political leader of comparable power--if he felt that his chances for a quick victory were

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[16] Ibid., p. 358.

favorable. This would be especially true if he were encouraged by an impressive military technological breakthrough or serious domestic crisis.

In the present rather limited discussion of the likelihood of serious disagreement between Communist China and the Soviet Union, it is often stated that the Soviets recognize that they, too, have an Nth country problem, and refuse to help the Chinese construct nuclear devices. Certainly this is a plausible thesis, but it could be accepted too readily by the American people or the government. This is a political evaluation that is based upon many factors. The subject calls for extensive study by the several governmental agencies concerned with the problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

VI. WHAT CONSTITUTES CONTROL?

If the United States Government has made any single disarmament position clear in the last fifteen years, it should be that this nation will not accept any disarmament program without "adequate" provisions for inspection and control. A demand for international inspection and control has been at the heart of nearly all of the U.S. proposals on disarmament. Not only does the United States insist upon control provisions, it insists also upon the establishment of the inspection and control system during the early stages of disarmament, either prior to or concurrent with any disarmament steps. It is clear that the government prefers the "prior" feature of establishing controls.

Yet, as often as the phrase "inspection and control" is mentioned, an observer still might wonder what is meant by "control." Is

the control feature considered implicit in inspection--a sort of moral guarantee of good conduct to avoid international censure resulting from a deliberate and detectable violation? Such a procedure would not be a control system at all. The concept of control in a disarmament scheme should involve functions beyond that of inspection. The following three capabilities are considered necessary for an effective control system: (1) a system of inspection which has the capability to detect a possible violation and to communicate immediately with an "International Control Organ," or other higher authority; (2) a capability for this higher authority to interpret and act upon this information; and, (3) an international police force stronger than any individual member of the system. The obvious difficulties in obtaining any such system under present circumstances does not alter the need for the "control" requirements involved.

The purpose of this paper is not to discuss substantive issues of disarmament or propose a new system of inspection and control. The purpose is to examine government organization for disarmament, not just to see what it is but to question its activities and capabilities. It is important to examine the capability of the U.S. organization to determine what is meant by "international inspection and control," and to insure that disarmament policy is properly founded on this concept.

The United States has proposed several general disarmament schemes in recent years. As mentioned, each one includes inspection and control provisions in the most broad form. If one of these proposals were to be accepted, would we be satisfied with the amount of control

provided--as distinct from inspection--assuming all other functions were properly executed at the start of the agreement?

Some of the criteria for a control system have been enumerated by representatives of the government on various occasions. A brief glance at two references to the problem of control will demonstrate that this matter has been under active consideration, and has been vexing our policy makers.

In 1959, while discussing the possible situation after disarmament had taken place, Secretary of State Herter commented:

> Are we going to come to a point where we are going to develop some form of international police force of sufficient strength and subject to a controlled direction on which the nations of the world can agree, which can be effective in maintaining the peace for all the world?[17]

The manner in which this question was asked indicates that this problem has not been thoroughly explored and analyzed by the government agencies concerned.

Less than a month later, the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, touched upon this matter in somewhat more detail. After specifying those areas of agreement and disagreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on disarmament matters, and after examining the subject of international inspection, Ambassador Lodge added:

> If all nations lay down their arms, there must be institutions to preserve international peace and security and to promote the

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[17] Department of State, Documents on Disarmament 1945-1959, Volume II, Department of State Publication 7008 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 1483, hereafter cited as Disarmament Documents, V. II.

> rule of law. It seems to the United States Government that there are three questions in particular to which detailed answers should be sought:
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> 1. What type of international police force should be established to preserve international peace and security?
> 2. What principles of international law should govern the use of such a force?
> 3. What internal security forces, in precise terms, would be required by the nations of the world if existing armaments are abolished?[18]

This is the problem of control, not inspection. Is the United States Government prepared to sign a disarmament treaty without substantial agreement on the three questions above? Some of the proposals would indicate that it is. An examination of the proposal of June 27, 1960, demonstrates that "effective international control" could mean, in effect, inspection and verification without control.[19] The only reference to a control system, as such, was in item 4 of Stage Two of the disarmament proposal, in which:

> 4. An international police force, within the United Nations, shall be progressively established and maintained with agreed personnel strength and armaments sufficient to preserve world peace when general and complete disarmament is achieved.[20]

This appears to be an inadequate treatment of what is considered a crucial issue. Stating that a police force (or a peace force) shall be established does not suggest the composition of the force, or even

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[18] *Ibid.*, p. 1496.

[19] Department of State, *Documents on Disarmament 1960*, Department of State Publication 7172 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 126-131, hereafter cited as *Disarmament Documents, 1960*.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 130.

more important, the nature of its political control and access to national territories in an emergency.

Perhaps it is felt that these matters are best left unresolved until after the first stage has been either commenced or completed. In this event, it is of utmost importance that United States planning should proceed vigorously to determine what the United States and its allies will accept as minimum measures of control. It would be dangerous to conduct negotiations on the assumption that certain planning is not required because agreement is not anticipated.

CHAPTER II

UNITED STATES DISARMAMENT POLICY PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II

The first significant disarmament negotiations in which the United States was involved as a young Republic were concerned both with the disarming of existing forces and the limitation of future military strength. These were the principal features of the renowned Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817 regarding the reduction and control of naval strength on the Great Lakes. Although tested and modified on various occasions, this agreement has survived and grown in stature for more than a century and a half. Until the Hague Peace Conference of 1899, ". . . the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817 was the outstanding achievement to which advocates of armament limitation could point."[1] The agreement also served as the extent of United States disarmament efforts until the Hague Conference.

The disarmament features debated at the Hague Conference, especially those dealing with naval forces, drew no effective support. The competition for foreign markets and the building of colonial empires precluded any realistic agreement. Although the United States expressed interest in the subjects of mediation and arbitration discussed at the conference, there was reluctance in the government to become involved in what was considered a European affair. In addition, the United States considered its military forces numerically much weaker than the European

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[1] Merze Tate, The United States and Armaments (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948), p. 34.

powers and, thus, not a proper subject for discussion of limitation.[2] Although the fundamental purposes of the conference were not realized, codes for the conduct of war were formulated. Much more significant, however, was the establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague for the peaceful settlement of international disputes.

The Second Hague Conference was convened in 1907 at a time of increased military expenditures and even less confidence among nations than eight years before. Colonial rivalries and increased discord on the European continent presented an atmosphere intolerable for successful disarmament negotiations. The arms race which gained additional impetus after the failure of the Second Hague Conference was climaxed by the outbreak of the First World War.

After the war, although much effort was expended discussing international arms limitation, the most productive activity was devoted to the problem of preventing future German militarism and restricting naval armaments. France particularly desired elaborate inspection and control systems imposed upon Germany. Discussion of measures to reduce arms in general often centered on wrangling over legalistic definitions of what constituted offensive and defensive arms, and there was little progress.

In one of his Fourteen Points, President Wilson proposed a reduction of arms "to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety." A similar provision was included as Article 8 of the Covenant of the

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[2] Also, several of the subjects discussed at The Hague Conference dealt with the possible prohibition of new and "formidable" weapons, ibid., p. 41.

League of Nations, which stated that". . . the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety . . . ." Article 9 created a permament Commission to act on these matters in an advisory capacity.

The League was not able to advance materially the cause of disarmament because each member viewed disarmament--then as now--from its own interests. At a special conference in February, 1932:

> The Russian proposal for general and immediate disarmament, and its alternative proposal for progressive and proportional reduction, were not accepted. The French proposed an international police force, which Germany opposed as intended to maintain the inequalities of the peace treaties. President Hoover proposed reduction by one third, with specific statement for various categories. The British also had suggestions for "qualitative" reduction.[3]

The same problems existed between the wars as have plagued the world since 1945. The differences between the inter-war and post-war periods are that (1) the international political conflict has been intensified by the reduced numbers of principle antagonists, and (2) modern weapons have increased the feeling of the urgency of disarmament. Despite our present sense of urgency, however, there has been no more success in resolving the political problem of security with disarmament in recent years than in the period between world wars.

There was slightly more progress outside the League of Nations, in the form of Naval Conferences. There were four major conferences on the limitation of naval armaments, held at Washington in 1921-1922, at Geneva in 1927, and in London in 1931 and 1935. The United States was

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[3] Clyde Eagleton, International Government (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1957), p. 474.

very active in these conferences, and took the initiative in calling the Washington and Geneva Conferences. The United States realized that its security could be much more readily assured by a limitation of the naval forces of the principal maritime powers.[4] It was also considered most important to stabilize the situation in the Pacific. From both aspects, the Washington Conference was at least temporarily a success.[5] A capital ship ratio for the five major powers was agreed upon, and a Four-Power Treaty among the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan was substituted for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1911.

Although the construction of capital ships had been successfully limited by the Washington Conference, competition in naval armaments after that conference shifted to large cruisers. An attempt to extend the ratio principle to cruisers and smaller ships at the Geneva Conference of 1927 was a failure. Several reasons for this failure could be cited: the problem was quite technical (especially from the point of view of England and the protection of her maritime empire); the

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[4] The plan presented to the Conference by Secretary of State Hughes ". . . had been carefully formulated on the basis of British acceptance in principle of naval parity with the United States. Its two objectives, therefore, were to limit naval competition and to secure for the United States a navy equal to that of any other power in the world." Tate, op. cit., p. 129.

[5] For a different interpretation, see ibid., p. 140. "In consenting in advance to scrap our excess tonnage in capital ships, the United States relinquished the most effective means of obtaining British consent to parity in all other categories. Likewise, in pledging ourselves not to add to the existing fortifications on Guam, Tutuila, the Aleutians, and the Philippines, we surrendered our power to act in the Far East not only to preserve the "Open Door" and the territorial integrity of China but to protect our own outlying possessions."

delegations were dominated by "technicians" rather than politicians;[6] Great Britain was not willing to accept cruiser parity; and, the fact that security considerations were not to be discussed at the conference caused France and Italy to withhold participation.[7] The Geneva Conference stands out as an example of a lack of adequate preparation by the United States, as well as a concentration upon the technical issues of disarmament to the detriment of the political. American and British views had diverged increasingly since the Washington Conference, and only thorough, advanced consideration of the positions of each side could have offered much hope for success.

After the disappointment of Geneva, the United States commenced a moderate naval construction program, but at the same time indicated a willingness to consider further discussion of limitation of naval armaments. A 1928 Anglo-French compromise agreement was not acceptable to the United States. The United States position was that effective action had to apply to all categories of naval ships, not just the limited areas of the Anglo-French agreement. Several months of exploratory diplomacy followed, centered on different theories of naval equality, gun sizes, and elaborate formulas. The diplomatic preparations leading up to the London Naval Conference of 1930 were highlighted by the extensive communications between the American and British Governments, with a personal meeting between Prime Minister MacDonald and President Hoover

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[6] Benjamin H. Williams, The United States and Disarmament (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1931), pp. 165-166.

[7] Tate, op. cit., p. 142.

in Washington in October, 1929. The groundwork for the London Conference was extensive and fruitful.

The American objectives at London were to "assure equality of naval strength for the United States and Great Britain," reach accord with Japan, and secure reductions in tonnage.[8] The importance attached to this conference by President Hoover is demonstrated by the imposing composition of the delegation, which was headed by Secretary of State Stimson.

Although the London Conference was not marked by general agreement among the five participants, it did result in greater accord between Great Britain and the United States. "To (President) Hoover it was clear that the settlement marked a great step toward disarmament and world peace."[9] The London Conference represented an alleviation of political issues and avoided the more technical wrangling that had characterized the Geneva meeting. Added to the peaceful hopes of the world following the signing of the Briand-Kellogg Pact, the London Conference bolstered international stability, if even for only a very limited time.

It was not long before international complications clouded the hopes for a lengthy period of peace without an arms race. Japan and Germany embarked upon domestic programs to increase their military strength, and Japan commenced her aggressive actions in Manchuria. Japan was no longer interested in the 5:5:3 ratio settled at Washington

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[8] Ibid., p. 176.

[9] Ibid., p. 182.

in 1922; she now demanded naval parity with Great Britain and the United States, a position wholly unacceptable to those two nations.

In the early thirties, the United States actively participated in the League of Nations efforts toward disarmament, especially in the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. The most significant U.S. step at this time was the proposal by President Hoover to the General Commission of the disarmament conference in June, 1932, for a one-third reduction in the armies of the world, as well as abolition of certain types of weapons and the prohibition of aerial bombardment:

> But the conference as a whole took no direct action on the Hoover proposals. It is possible that if they had been supported by England and France some treaty for the limitation of armaments would have been signed during the summer, the German delegation would not have withdrawn from the conference, and Adolf Hitler might not have come into power.[10]

A later American proposal, after the Roosevelt Administration had taken office, suggested that:

> . . . a system of adequate supervision should be formulated to insure the effective and faithful carrying out of any measure of disarmament. We are prepared to assist in this formulation and to participate in this supervision. We are heartily in sympathy with the idea that means of effective, automatic, and continuous supervision should be found whereby nations will be able to rest assured that as long as they respect their obligations with regard to armaments, the corresponding obligations of their neighbors will be carried out in the same scrupulous manner.[11]

There was little support among the European nations for such a momentous proposal. International tension was mounting too rapidly to

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[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 106-7.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 110.

provide a climate for agreement. For the first time, however, United States disarmament policy incorporated the principle of inspection and control.

The final major effort to limit armaments before the Second World War was the London Naval Conference of 1935. Japanese insistence that they be granted full naval parity limited the effectiveness of the conference. There was no attempt to set up a treaty containing quantitative restrictions, a former cornerstone of American proposals. Instead, the United States delegation was forced to accept qualitative restrictions in the form of limited battleship tonnage and the future reduction of the caliber of guns from 16 to 14 inches. Japan was not a signatory to the London Treaty, and would not agree to its provisions even outside the treaty framework. As Japan pressed her naval construction, Great Britain, France, and the United States invoked the ""escalator clause" and commenced their own construction program. The race to World War II was on.

It is interesting to compare two views of American disarmament policy in this period between the wars, especially since both views refer primarily to the first decade of this period, although written more than fifteen years apart. In 1931, it was observed that:

> The United States has thus far played a progressive and constructive part in matters of armament limitation and this policy has been strictly in line with our national interests from both the materialistic and idealistic points of view.[12]

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[12] Williams, op. cit., p. 309.

After World War II had been concluded and the outline of a new political and military conflict was beginning to take form, a different author commented that:

> Sixteen years of attempted limitation of naval armament by the conference or legislative method had ended with the great naval powers returning to virtually unrestricted competition. Efforts in behalf of naval disarmament based upon security ratios had begun with the scrapping of capital ships and agreements not to fortify Pacific bases. All attempts to bring about limitation ceased in 1938. Japan's rivals in that year were in a far less favorable position than they had been in 1921. Neither Great Britain nor the United States was any longer capable of protecting by force of arms territory in the western Pacific. Both, therefore, were to face humiliating and catastrophic defeats as a direct result of the concessions they had made at Washington in 1922.[13]

These evaluations are contradictory, but the contradiction can best be explained by the difference in time of the two views. Perhaps the first is the more reasonable interpretation of two different aspects of the same problem. The United States had played a responsible role in disarmament affairs in the decade 1921-1931. Usually the American negotiators had come to the conference table with commendable motives, their position well prepared, and led by senior and able diplomats. Failure of the conferences to produce international stability in the late thirties could be laid at any of several doorsteps other than the naval conferences. Disarmament agreements themselves do not necessarily produce international stability and reduce tension. The political resolution of international differences must precede or accompany disarmament to make it effective and enduring.

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[12] Tate, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

CHAPTER III

UNITED STATES DISARMAMENT POLICY - ITS DEVELOPMENT SINCE WORLD WAR II

An impressive amount of dramatic literature has been produced accenting the "new era ushered in" by the first explosion of an atomic device in July, 1945. Since that milestone in history, atomic energy has had its effect on nearly every phase of human endeavor from anthropology through zoology, and to deny the extent of its imprint on disarmament matters would be absurd. It has added a new dimension to modern disarmament negotiations: fear of the impending destruction of civilization. Yet the importance or significance of the effect of this new dimension upon the subject of most of the disarmament negotiations since World War II--the control of atomic energy for military purposes--should not be overly exaggerated. Despite the terrible consequences inherent in the newest weapons, the threat of atomic annihilation has not altered fundamental human relationships or led to a revision of the international political system. The terror of mutual annihilation has not driven humanity to new pinnacles of international respect and accommodation. The basic disarmament problem remains the same: to strive for a form of control over weapons (or their effects) when each nation feels--to some degree--that armaments are a basic attribute of its sovereignty and still fundamental to its security.

Because of the awesome characteristics of atomic and nuclear weapons, it was natural that attempts to control armaments since World War II should concentrate on controlling atomic energy in some manner.

Although conventional armaments have often been discussed in disarmament conferences since 1945, they have been treated more in the nature of a bargaining point in order to give the negotiator more maneuvering room. Package proposals, with emphasis upon limitations on atomic weapons, have often had unpalatable conditions with respect to conventional arms included to make the entire package unacceptable.

From the most sweeping proposal of international control and development of atomic energy, U.S. disarmament sights have gradually lowered over the last fifteen years to the extent that in 1961 efforts were confined primarily to seeking a limitation of testing nuclear weapons. United States disarmament policy from 1945 through 1961 reflects not only the changing political scene and new technical developments in military science, but in a small manner reflects also our governmental organization and effort for disarmament. It is neither an accident nor entirely a result of the political climate that produced the most comprehensive United States disarmament activity in 1946, 1955-1957, and 1961.

The United States possessed an atomic bomb in 1945, but had no policy regarding this new weapon except to use it in the defeat of Japan. Politically, the government might have been better advised to use the bomb first to threaten Japan into submission but our horizons at the time were limited to military applications. Although debate over the immediate and future uses of atomic energy took place prior to the first test, it was not until some months after the war was over that the United States position with regard to control of atomic energy and

weapons was formulated.[1] All possible theories of approaches to the problem were presented during the limited governmental debate: sharing of atomic information, international control of the production of atomic energy, and absolute American secrecy and control for as long as possible. The story of the development of our disarmament policy in these early post-war months has been well told elsewhere and does not call for repetition here.[2] After it had finally been determined that U.S. policy should be to retain its essential atomic knowledge as an American monopoly, yet at the same time seek a foolproof system of international control, a committee under the direction of Dean Acheson was formed at the Department of State. Shortly after, a group of consultants under the leadership of David Lilienthal were gathered to work with the Acheson committee to establish the framework of such a policy. The Acheson-Lilienthal Report was then used as the foundation of the Baruch Plan which was presented to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in June, 1946.

The heart of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report was international control of production, and to this was added the Baruch concept of

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[1] This period from 1945 to 1947 is graphically presented (as the "Era of the Baruch Plan") in Richard J. Barnet, Who Wants Disarmament? (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), Part I.

[2] Especially recommended are Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1961), Chapters III and IV; and Barnet, op. cit., pp. 7-21. A highly readable historical report is "The Diplomacy of Disarmament," International Conciliation, 526:239-242, January, 1960.

sanctions by an international force to be used against a violator. There was to be no major-power veto, of course; and the United States was to retain its bombs until such time as it unilaterally determined that the proper international controls had been established.

Although many high-level policy makers in the U.S. Government devoted much time and effort to the Acheson-Lilienthal Report and the Baruch Plan, there are indications that there was not sufficient thought devoted to some of the basic political issues involved. Assuming that our offer to exchange a powerful weapon which only the United States possessed for future international control of these weapons was as sincere as it was generous, we should have examined more carefully its chances of acceptance. Four reasons have been offered, any one of which could have precluded agreement by the Soviet Union.[3] These reasons are (1) U.S. retention of the bomb during the implementation of the control system; (2) international control of any future atomic industry in the U.S.S.R.; (3) an international inspection system; and (4) the power of sanctions without great power veto.

Not only had our planners apparently ignored possible Soviet objections to such a plan which was weighted in our favor by factor (1) above, but also our entire disarmament concept at this time centered around developing a "foolproof" system of controls. Such a concept was fallacious, even at this time, and tended to result in only the most detailed systems of international inspection that were anathema to the Soviet Union. By the time (around the mid-1950's) we had reoriented our

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[3] Barnet, op. cit., pp. 13-14.

thinking and had shaken loose of our requirement for an attempted foolproof inspection and control system, the numerical progression in stores of nuclear weapons had rendered even a nominal risk scheme nearly obsolete.

It also appears that our disarmament planners in this early stage made little attempt to establish a bargaining position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. The United States had an atomic weapons monopoly; and as we rapidly demobilized our conventional forces in 1945-1946, the Russians soon had a large preponderance of conventional power. Had the United States commenced its negotiations with proposals to disarm conventional forces to an equally low level with the U.S.S.R., it is possible that the Soviets would have been more receptive to controls on atomic energy production. This does not mean that we should have negotiated in "bad faith"--our ultimate goal of international control of atomic energy need not have changed--but we might have placed ourselves in a better bargaining position. Whatever hindsight may indicate fifteen years later, it seems quite likely from an overall review of the Soviet Union's disarmament policy since World War II that the Soviets were interested in 1946 only in United States unilateral disarmament without controls.

The Baruch Plan served as the basis for American disarmament policy in the United Nations for nearly nine years. However, except for the initial 1946-1948 phase, disarmament soon became a dead issue as the cold war heated up and the world's attention became absorbed with events in Korea. During this quiet period, disarmament issues were handled

perfunctorily in the United Nations. Baruch had resigned his position in early 1947, and after his departure there was no disarmament negotiator with independent stature and direct access to the President until the appointment of Mr. Stassen.[4]

Just as our policy grew sterile with inactivity, so did our disarmament organization. Those who had labored over the Acheson-Lilienthal Report and the Baruch Plan dispersed, and the full-time Disarmament Staff at the Department of State was reduced to a handful of professionals.[5]

It is probable that no more than a handful were required. The positions of both sides were so in opposition that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could maintain interest in disarmament:

> These were the barren years of the negotiations. They were barren not only because they were dominated by propaganda but also because they were lacking in new ideas and new approaches to disarmament. Since neither side felt much incentive to make any progress on substantive questions of disarmament, the negotiators spent much of their time on procedural questions such as what to discuss and when to discuss it. The result was a series of meetings in which the locale and personalities changed but the substance of the talks remained the same.[6]

The United States reluctantly entered into talks with the Soviet Union on reducing conventional forces, and in 1952 introduced its own plan for the reduction of conventional forces. This, however, was the period of the so-called "parallel monologue" in which mutual recrimination and justification of positions dominated the United Nations debates

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[4] Bechhoefer, op. cit., p. 53.

[5] Infra, Chapter V on the Department of State.

[6] Barnet, op. cit., p. 24.

that often seemed endless and tiringly familiar. Although not so stated, it was obviously recognized that any fruitful discussions would have to await the settling of the Korean war.

In the early fifties, three basic developments occurred that altered the entire disarmament picture; three or four years were required for these changes to take root and have their full effect, but it is reasonably safe to say that the disarmament situation had stabilized by 1957 and has not altered significantly in the remaining four years. These developments were (1) changes in the political leadership in both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., with more importance attached to the latter; (2) the political settlement of the Korean war; and, (3) the development of the hydrogen bomb by both the Soviet Union and the United States. No one of these three factors standing alone is of enough importance to be considered crucial but taken together with their immediate consequences they represent an entirely new disarmament situation.

The conclusion of the military operations in Korea, which had been successfully limited both in geography and use of weapons, combined with a more aggressive yet more subtle and flexible leadership in the Kremlin, resulted in a renewed Soviet disarmament emphasis. The tactic of the Soviet disarmament offensive was to combine threats of destruction with appeals to reasonableness in order to ensure a peaceful, disarmed world. The advent of nuclear weapons and their tremendous destructive capacity provided the appropriate tool for Khrushchev. He now had, supposedly, a military "equalizer" that could place him on the same power footing with the West, and in the same instrument a weapon of almost unknown destructive quality that called for disarmament efforts

of unprecedented magnitude. The Soviet approach to disarmament, although at least a quarter century old, was perfectly tailored to the imperative of the hydrogen bomb: the only effective control of such a monstrous weapon was complete disarmament, now.

By 1954 the United States had dropped the Baruch Plan as its basis for negotiation. At the same time, military policy underwent a major reorientation as the "New Look"--decided upon in 1953--was implemented. Gradually, atomic weapons began to be integrated into the military forces in great numbers; "massive retaliation" became an overworked symbol; and a preponderant reliance on strategic air power, similar to the pre-Korean U.S. military posture, came into being. At about the same time, it was recognized by many on both sides that the opportunity for effective control had either been lost or was fast fading.

It is with this situation as a backdrop that the government under President Eisenhower's direction undertook the most momentous disarmament effort to date. Harold Stassen was appointed Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament. Under his direction, an enlarged staff was assembled, and extensive studies were commenced. Yet, despite the scope of this activity, there appeared to be a fundamental contradiction, similar to some of the political problems discussed in Chapter I, inherent in the national security policy of this period:

> . . . despite the fact that U.S. policy was strongly rooted in nuclear defense, and complete atomic disarmament seemed

hopelessly impractical, the Administration supported precisely such a proposal in the United Nations.[7]

The United States had not fitted its disarmament policy into the framework of national security and foreign policy. This serves to emphasize a lack of attention to the determination of basic political objectives.

As has been pointed out by one specialist, the U.S. decision to support the Anglo-French proposals of June 1954 was a major shift in American disarmament policy.[8] General disarmament was now accepted for the first time as the primary objective of the plan; the Baruch-Acheson-Lilienthal concept of international ownership of atomic energy production had been abandoned; and, reliance on the development of a "fool-proof" control system had been shelved as patently impossible. Although this offer of controlled disarmament by stages was quickly rejected by the U.S.S.R., it still influenced western disarmament positions for the next several years. The United States, henceforth, adopted "general disarmament" as its fundamental goal in nearly all arms talks, although one writer suggests that the primary motivation in 1953 was "psychological warfare."[9]

Still, the 1954 proposals were a milestone that led to the closest approach, three years later, to a disarmament agreement between the Soviets and the western powers:

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[7] Barnet, op. cit., p. 32.

[8] Ibid., pp. 30-31.

[9] Ibid., p. 33.

> Of all the many proposals and counter-proposals now filling the waste-paper baskets of the Disarmament Subcommittee, the Anglo-French Plan was undoubtedly the fairest and best-balanced attempt to ensure that disarmament and security proceeded hand in hand. In sum, the West was saying for the first time to the Soviet Union, "We will ban the bomb if you will accept proper control plus parity in ordinary armaments and armed forces."[10]

There was a tortuous path in American disarmament policy to be followed, however, before the mid-1957 near agreement could be reached. Although the Soviets had initially rejected the 1954 plan, they later indicated interest in the nature of the scheme and on May 10, 1955, the U.S.S.R. proposed a program quite similar in stages to the western offer of the previous year. The force levels proposed by the Soviet Union were essentially the same as in the western proposal and the programmed stages were similar, although the Soviet plan was typically circumspect about the details of inspection and control.

Whether accidental or otherwise, the Soviet timing for this proposal was embarrassing to the United States. President Eisenhower had just appointed Mr. Stassen to his cabinet-level position in the Administration; and the United States, obviously not prepared to discuss the plan (although it was quite similar to one the United States had just endorsed), requested a recess of the Disarmament Subcommittee. This delay was ostensibly to prepare for the approaching Summit Conference, but actually

> . . . the Administration seems not to have considered the implications of the proposals to which it had been willing to lend its name. Critical examination of disarmament policy did not seem particularly urgent, since the likelihood of Russian

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[10] Anthony Nutting, Disarmament: An Outline of the Negotiations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 11.

acquiescence appeared remote. Disarmament had therefore been given a low priority in the formulation of foreign policy.[11]

At the Summit, President Eisenhower introduced his "open skies" proposal, which, similar to the atoms-for-peace plan of 1953, was neither an arms control nor a disarmament measure except in the most broad sense. They were, in effect, "confidence building" exercises or first steps toward anticipated comprehensive arms control programs. They were the first indications of the new philosophy of arms control that was to become current toward the end of the decade. President Eisenhower's offer to exchange military blueprints and arrange reciprocal aerial reconnaissance was also the start of a trend to shift the locale for disarmament negotiations from a broad scale at the United Nations to more restricted bodies, both inside and outside the United Nations.

At the resumption of the meeting of the subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission at the end of August, the U.S.S.R. requested clarification of certain points relevant to force levels, prohibition of the use of atomic weapons, and discontinuance of tests. The United States representative, Mr. Stassen, at this time placed a ". . . reservation upon all of its pre-Geneva substantive positions . . ." thus wiping the slate clean for new U.S. proposals, with or without embodying previous features. The stated reason for this move was the worsening problem of establishing satisfactory inspection for past nuclear production, but in effect it gave the Soviets a wide

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[11] Barnet, op. cit., p. 36.

opening for scoring a propaganda victory. This reservation appeared not only to split the United States from the British and French positions, but it also appeared as an American withdrawal as a result of Soviet acceptance of certain positions.

Although the exercise of the reservation may have been a logical move, it was a political error.[12] After having committed itself to the principle of "complete prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons," and having worked so assiduously to secure Soviet acceptance of this point, the U.S. reservation of positions so soon after Soviet concurrence reflected poor preparation of negotiating positions. It appeared that:

> . . . the Soviet admission that nuclear stocks could be concealed in violation of a treaty was used by the United States to justify its abandonment of the idea of complete nuclear disarmament.[13]

The havoc created by this reservation has been succinctly described by one authority:

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[12] Bechhoefer, op. cit., pp. 312-315. Mr. Bechhoefer attributes this development to the shift in emphasis from "comprehensive disarmament" to "partial measures." "The two main differences between the evolution of the Russian position and that of the West were:

1. The Russians moved faster and were ready with their program of partial measures a year before the West.

2. The West at this period forgot one of the fundamentals of all negotiations with the Soviet Union: that the Western proposals not only must be technically sound but must be politically attractive, since the Soviet Union will invariably interrupt any negotiation, however serious, to secure a propaganda advantage. The United States reservation of positions gave the Soviet Union the opportunity to reap such an advantage."

[13] Barnet, op. cit., p. 38.

> Although neither the British nor the French Government went as far as the United States, it was all too clear in the autumn session of the Subcommittee that the American reservation had damaged the whole Western position, exposed the West to charges of backsliding, and handed the initiative to the Soviets.[14]

The net result of the American reservation was to start the minuet all over again, although not quite from the beginning. For the remainder of 1955 and through most of 1956, the Soviet and Western delegates examined in succession several specific issues, gradually moving further away from the concept of comprehensive disarmament. By 1957 all the nuclear powers had clearly recognized the impossibility of truly effective inspection because of the extent of previous nuclear production, and so the negotiations became centered on issues other than nuclear disarmament. Arms control had arrived as a legitimate philosophy.

Although there were serious and encouraging negotiations on specific issues with the Soviets through 1956 and into 1957,[15]

> There was still no agreement, however, on where the elimination of nuclear weapons would fit into the complex disarmament framework now emerging from the negotiations.[16]

The re-evaluation of the American position continued during and despite the negotiations still being conducted at the Disarmament Commission Subcommittee. The need for such an examination had been suggested on December 5, 1955, to the General Assembly by Ambassador Lodge:

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[14] Nutting, op. cit., p. 19.

[15] Barnet, op. cit., pp. 40-41. Some of the subjects of discussion were zones for aerial inspection, control of delivery vehicles, missile test ban, and others.

[16] Ibid., p. 41.

> An intensive review of the inspection problem (was required); and some new and radical conception which would offer the world time, security, and confidence while it tackled the problem.[17]

As has been noted, Governor Stassen, after his March, 1955, appointment, assembled a staff to conduct such a review and a new appraisal of U.S. disarmament policy. This was the

> . . . beginning of a new pragmatic approach in shaping U.S. arms control policy. The nuclear age with its great advances in military technology in but a very brief time, had made the search for absolute solutions impossible.[18]

A set of principles was formulated in 1955 to serve as a guide for U.S. policy.[19] These principles centered around inspection and control, as did the United States proposals in London in March, 1956. It was not until November of 1956, however, that the United States reached its decisions on new proposals, and these were spelled out before the General Assembly on March 19, 1957, by Ambassador Lodge.[20]

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[17] Department of State, Disarmament: The Intensified Effort, 1955-1958 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 21.

[18] Ibid., p. 10.

[19] Ibid., p. 13, for this list of principles.

[20] Ibid., pp. 33-34. Ambassador Lodge listed the following objectives for the negotiations:

"1. To reverse the trend toward larger stockpiles of nuclear weapons and to reduce the future nuclear threat.

2. To provide against great surprise attack and thus reduce the danger of major war.

3. To lessen the burden of armaments and to make possible improved standards of living.

4. To ensure that research and development activities concerning the propulsion of objects through outer space be devoted exclusively to scientific and peaceful purposes.

5. To ease tensions and to facilitate settlement of difficult political issues . . . ."

Although there was reference to a reduction of the "burden of armaments," generally this policy statement concerned specific segments

Both the Soviet Union and the Western powers in discussions over the next few weeks effectively abandoned previous approaches to general disarmament--although this was usually noted as a fundamental goal--and instead searched for partial measures that appeared to have more promise. The positions of both sides moved considerably closer to each other throughout the late spring, and many participants and observers on both sides were quite optimistic. Although this optimism was, unfortunately, not justified by later events, it seems a little strange in retrospect why it was so strong at the time. Although the Soviets had shifted--as had the West--to partial measures in place of general disarmament and had moved toward the West's position on other points, there was still the same generality and ambiguity regarding control systems, to cite the primary obstacle. When discussing stages of international control in the reduction of conventional forces in their proposals of April 30, 1957, the Soviet delegates talked in terms of "appropriate international control," and added that:

> . . . the functions of control will include the collection and analysis of information provided by States on their implementation of partial disarmament measures. Those functions should be performed, as agreed by the parties, by a control organ established for the purpose under the Security Council.[21]

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of the disarmament problem that could be considered the most likely subjects for negotiations.

The report then remarked that "None of these proposals was dramatically new in substance. Earlier sessions of the Subcommittee had labored over similar versions. . . . But . . . there were signs that a genuine negotiation might develop . . . ."

[21] Department of State, Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Volume II, 1957-1959, Department of State Publication 7070 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 782.

Also included in these proposals were the usual requirements of renunciation of atomic and hydrogen weapons and the removal of military bases from foreign soil. Nevertheless, the proposals represented a significant advance on the Soviet part and provided an adequate basis for serious negotiations. They also served to spotlight any Western response.

Of primary interest to the subject of this paper is what developed in the next two months within the U.S. Government. There can be no final or detailed determination of this matter, of course, because of the intricate and hazy process by which U.S. disarmament policy has been made,[22] the personalities of the leading disarmament figures, and the unavailability of detailed documentary information as to the individual and departmental positions taken at the time. Whether one is inclined to support or disagree with U.S. disarmament policy in mid-1957, it can hardly be claimed that responsible governmental organization was conducive to the formation of the most effective and advantageous policy.

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[22] See Thomas E. Murray, Nuclear Policy for War and Peace (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1960), p. 202, in which the late former Commissioner describes the procedure for formulating nuclear policy is made: "When we come right down to it, it is not easy to say precisely who makes atomic energy policy in the United States or how it is made. If one were to try to trace the making of a basic nuclear policy decision, he would have to go through a tortuous maze of governmental agencies that initiate or suggest policies, draft position papers on proposed policies, advise, dilute, compromise, and modify policy proposals. He would probably get lost or give up before he had completed his quest through the State Department, the Department of Defense, the Joint Committee, the National Security Council, the Operations Coordinating Board, the President's special staff assistants on scientific affairs, disarmament, and other matters, and the Atomic Energy Commission itself."

The crucial issue from the organizational point of view was the relationship of Harold Stassen and his disarmament assistants to the rest of the Executive Branch, specifically the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense, as well as the Chairman of the AEC. In any organization there will be both structural and personal relationships, and the strengths of one can seldom fully overcome the defects of the other; usually the defects of either will aggravate the weaknesses of the other. No wholly satisfactory organization for disarmament can be found, but perhaps the framework in existence in early 1957 was as good as any that could be devised, and certainly better than pre-1957 organization. Yet, personal and official relations somehow were not productively established. A participant in official disarmament negotiations has noted that:

> The separation of Stassen and his staff from the governmental agencies responsible for the development of United States policy in this field, created an administrative pattern readily leading to conflict and confusion within the government. Unfortunately, Stassen's personal relationships with the policy-making agencies--the State Department, Defense Department, and Atomic Energy Commission--were never sufficiently close to overcome this administrative handicap.[23]

One observer would have had the disarmament failure in 1957 charged to the Pentagon and the AEC as a result of ". . . the most violent internal administration battle yet over the disarmament talks."[24]

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[23] Bechhoefer, op. cit., p. 436.

[24] Walter Lippmann, "The Disarmament Issue," The Washington Post, July 2, 1957, p. 15. Regarding the governmental consensus for the disarmament policy it was following, Lippmann commented that ". . . the President and his administration have a policy to which some are opposed, and about which the rest are not convinced."

This is a simple explanation that hardly does justice to the complexity of the negotiations or the issues, not only with the Soviet Union but also with our allies and within the government itself. It is this last aspect of disarmament policy formulation that has often been regrettable for slowness and confusion in the past.

Another critic of the U.S. organizational efforts at this time observed that:

> In the case of disarmament it has now transpired that he [Eisenhower] started the diplomatic exchanges with no real agreement within his own official family, with no adequate understanding with our allies, and with his own mind still fluid.[25]

There had been delays by the Western Powers in the negotiations so that there could be consultation with home governments and the NATO nations, and undoubtedly there had been some backstepping by the Allies on occasional issues. Regrettable as these irritants were, however, it is this writer's opinion that by themselves these problems did not cause the eventual rupture of negotiations at the end of August, 1957. There are areas of valid criticism of Western policy and procedure, but to place the blame for failure solely upon the Allies is not reasonable. It seems clear that, even in mid-1957, there would still have to be major concessions by both sides in order to reach agreement. The disarmament issues that required concessions were (1) the nature of an inspection system; (2) the question of prohibition of atomic weapons; and (3) the timing of the stages of reduction of conventional armaments.

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[25] Chalmers M. Roberts, writing in The Washington Post, June 2, 1957, claimed that "Time and again Stassen fought the Pentagon and the AEC for approval of specific ideas to carry it [U.S. disarmament policy]

Although these were important issues, the United States should have been just as concerned with (1) international agreement on control of CBR weapons; (2) the question of Communist China; and (3) the problem of implementing control concurrently with an inspection system.[26]

Disarmament efforts since 1957 have been concentrated on attempts to write a treaty to ban nuclear tests. The basic goal of general and complete disarmament is still professed, especially by the Soviet Union, but there has been little serious attempt at comprehensive disarmament, despite a flurry of proposals at the United Nations General Assembly in the fall of 1959 and in the following spring.[27] Other than the brief and unproductive preliminary discussions of methods to prevent surprise attack which took place in the fall of 1958, the emphasis has been placed on discussions to establish a workable system for the monitoring and control of nuclear tests.

The United States apparently entered into the negotiations on a nuclear test ban with considerable reluctance, and not a very well prepared position. As Mr. Bechhoefer has stated, it meant that President

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out." Roberts stated that the U.S. proposals were "essentially accepted" by the Soviet's counterproposal of April 30, but this writer would not agree with that interpretation for reasons previously stated.

[26] See Chapter I, "After Disarmament, What" for a brief discussion of this problem. Philip Noel-Baker, The Arms Race (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1958), p. 232, mentioned this vital political issue. "In 1955 they [the United States Government] had dropped the UN Plan; they had accepted Inspection, in principle, instead. But no one had even suggested any system by which control by simple Inspection could be made to work."

[27] See Disarmament Documents, V. II, Documents Nos. 376, 378, and 393; Disarmament Documents, 1960, pp. 68, 100, and 126.

Eisenhower had to "untie the August 29 package."[28] It also required a new forum for the negotiations since the Soviets would have no more to do with the Disarmament Commission Subcommittee, and had refused to accept a Commission broadened from eleven to twenty-five members.

In early 1958 there was an exchange of views between the U.S.S.R. and the United States regarding the convening of technical conferences. In July, the technical meeting on cessation of nuclear tests got under way, followed in November by the conference of experts to study the prevention of surprise attack. The latter conference lasted less than six weeks, but the conference of experts on nuclear test ban produced an agreement that was to serve as the basis of the marathon negotiations that have stretched (as of the summer of 1961) over nearly three years. These negotiations have been called ". . . by all odds the most important developments in the field of arms control since World War II."[29]

Before examining the United States role in the test ban negotiations, the conference on surprise attack should be mentioned briefly.[30] This conference served to emphasize two failings in U.S. disarmament preparation: (1) the reluctance, or failure, to commence extensive research sufficiently in advance of the negotiations, develop a corps of negotiators, and formulate basic positions prior to a conference; and

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[28] Bechhoefer, *op. cit.*, p. 445.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 457.

[30] See Department of State, *Official Report of the United States Delegation to the Conference of Experts for the Study of Possible Measures Which Might be Helpful in Preventing Surprise Attack and for the Preparation of a Report Thereon to Governments* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1959), especially pp. 7-10.

(2) the concentration on technical issues to the neglect of the political issues. The conference on the prevention of surprise attack was a model of thorough preparation of the technical problems (despite the lack of time) as viewed through American eyes with a strange disregard of the basic political obstacles that were likely to delay agreement.[31]

The circumstances surrounding the preparation of the U.S. position are of importance:

> Over the years the United States could frequently be accused of failure to attach proper importance to arms control negotiations and failure to give the representatives the administrative and financial support required for a meaningful negotiation. For this conference the administrative and financial arrangements of the United States were more than ample. The United States delegation consisted of fifty experts and advisers. It included eminent scientists such as Dr. G. B. Kistiakowsky and Dr. J. B. Wiesner and high ranking military officers such as General O. P. Weyland of the United States Air Force and Rear Admiral P. L. Dudley of the United States Navy. The chief of the delegation, William C. Foster, had an outstanding record both in business and the United States Government, with no previous exposure to the subject of disarmament. Furthermore, he was appointed to the position less than thirty days prior to the convening of the meeting. The senior political adviser, an experienced Foreign Service Officer, Julius Holmes, had served ten weeks in London in the summer of 1957 as a deputy to Governor Stassen. The only other members of the delegation with substantial previous experience in the field of arms control negotiations were three capable assistants who played a relatively minor role in the decisions of the delegation.[32]

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[31] In testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament, the head of the delegation, Mr. William C. Foster, stated that "We were much impressed by the importance which Soviet representatives attached to secrecy as a military asset," as quoted in Bechhoefer, *op. cit.*, p. 484. It should have been obvious previous to this that the Soviet Union would certainly not consider a detailed inspection system without corresponding disarmament steps because of the marked advantage this would give the West in penetrating Soviet secrecy.

[32] Bechhoefer, *op. cit.*, pp. 468-469.

Developments since this conference indicate that the government has profited from the experience. Organization has improved, additional basic research has been implemented on a more continuing basis, and a body of experts in the executive agencies has gradually come into existence. However, there was to be at least one more embarrassing reversal for U.S. disarmament efforts in the winter 1958-1959.

The story of the progress of the "Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests" has been told with detail and clarity in several publications.[33] These negotiations constitute the most serious and productive--as well as most lengthy--disarmament negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States. They also demonstrate the extent to which arms control goals have been lowered since World War II, in an attempt to reach an agreement that would "build confidence" as well as establish some degree of arms control.

Early meetings between the U.K., the U.S.S.R., and the U.S.A. in November and December followed a familiar pattern. The United States and Great Britain presented their views,

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[33] Especially recommended are the following three: (1) United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests: Analysis of Progress and Positions of the Participating Parties, October 1958-August 1960, Report of the Subcommittee on Disarmament, 86th Congress, 2d Session, October 1960 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), hereafter cited as Conference on Tests; (2) Department of State, Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, Department of State Publication 7090 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), hereafter cited as Geneva Conference 1958-60; (3) Bechhoefer, op. cit., Chapter XIX, "The Nuclear Test Cessation Conferences."

> . . . maintaining that any agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests must also contain the details of an international system of control and an obligation to establish such a system . . . ,[34]

and the Soviet Union "maintained that, before controls were discussed, the Conference must reach agreement on a permanent cessation of tests."[35]

Eventually, a moratorium on tests was announced by the negotiating States for various periods of time, and later disagreement between the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain and the United States centered around the composition, functions, and powers of the control organ.

From the aspect of the effect that government organization has on policy, the most significant development was in the area of technical support. The United States was ably represented by technical as well as political experts, most of them with previous valuable experience in disarmament negotiations. However, the United States proceeded to the Geneva negotiations with insufficient (as it developed) scientific information regarding the ability we had to detect underground explosions and identify them as non-earthquakes. This information, which was based upon a test (Ranier) that was not originally intended as an experiment in underground detection, was presented soon after the conference commenced. Tests in the fall of 1958--specifically designed for this purpose--produced much less optimistic data:

> The data, when thoroughly analyzed, led to two conclusions: (1) The method of distinguishing earthquakes from explosions by the direction of the earth's movement, as reported on seismographs, is less effective than previously estimated; and (2)

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[34] Geneva Conference, 1958-1960, p. 2.

[35] Ibid., p. 2.

> the number of earthquakes per year equivalent to a nuclear explosion of a given yield is about double that previously estimated.[36]

This new data, presented to the conference on January 5, 1959, created consternation among the Soviet delegation, which ". . . refused to consider the data and claimed that it was submitted solely to place an obstacle in the way of agreement."[37] For some time the conference failed to move, until an exchange of correspondence between President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev broke up the technical jam.

There has been, of course, much criticism of the efforts to enter into these negotiations before having developed a solid position, especially on the technical issues. The combination of lack of preparation for the political problems that arose at the conference on prevention of surprise attack, and lack of preparation of technical issues at the test ban conference have accented the apparent need for the government to be conducting extensive and continuing basic research on as many areas of promise as possible.

The Hardtack II tests emphasized the requirement for an extensive study of nuclear test detection. Accordingly,

> . . . at the request of the Department of State, the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology had, on December 28, 1958, appointed a panel on Seismic Improvement, under the chairmanship of Lloyd Berkner, president of Associated Universities, Inc., to review in the light of this new seismic data the feasibility of improving the detection system recommended at the 1958 technical conference. This panel reported its findings on

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[36] Ibid., p. 10.

[37] Ibid., p. 10.

> March 16, 1959. Subsequently the panel also submitted a detailed report entitled "The Need for Fundamental Research in Seismology."[38]

This was the birth of Project Vela, which is the principle subject of discussion in Chapter VII, Arms Control and Research.

The controversy within the U.S. Government on the question of nuclear tests has also been thoroughly discussed in several books and periodicals. The problem of the publication of the views of individual officials that are in agreement with the government is not confined to disarmament matters, and really need not be discussed in a paper dealing with organization. The President is the "head of his family," and there should be no significant problem of divergent opinion that could not be readily resolved.

A footnote to the postwar disarmament story has been provided by the negotiations on general disarmament in 1959-1960. The story of the negotiations themselves in the Ten-Power Disarmament Committee is a familiar one.[39] In the Ten-Power Committee, the Soviet Union had finally gained its long sought position of parity with the West, mostly as a result of its attack on the structure of the Disarmament Subcommittee of the United Nations, in which the Soviets were the sole representatives of the Communist bloc. Proposals on both general disarmament and partial measures were sprinkled throughout the eight months from the convening of the General Assembly of the United Nations

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[38] Bechhoefer, op. cit., p. 509.

[39] For an excellent historical and analytical presentation of these negotiations, see ibid., Chapter XX, "The General Disarmament Negotiations."

in September, 1959, to the breakup of the Ten-Power Disarmament Subcommittee in June 1960 by the walkout of the Communist members. Some tactical ground was surrendered by both sides during the negotiations, but the same basic difficulties on the degree of inspection and control and international authority divided the two camps.

The organization for disarmament has suffered heavy criticism for its efforts during this period. In the late fall and early winter 1959-1960, a group of consultants and specialists under Charles A. Coolidge was summoned by President Eisenhower and charged with the task of once again reviewing America's disarmament policies. The report of the Coolidge Committee has not been made public, but it was reported to be too sketchy to serve as a basis for establishing policy for negotiations.

> Fundamentally, the Coolidge Committee recommendations were for further armaments rather than disarmament. The report apparently opposed any cutback either in conventional or nuclear weapons or any agreement to ban underground nuclear testing without regard to safeguards. It is true that a strong defense position cannot only be consistent with arms control but also can facilitate arms control. However, the Coolidge report, as far as is known, made no attempt to develop arms control proposals in harmony with a strong defense posture. The report again demonstrated that even an individual of ability and good will cannot, in a period of sixty or ninety days, master the subject of international arms control sufficiently to produce any significant contribution.[40]

Because the Coolidge report was not employed as the sole basis for the U.S. position at the Ten-Power Disarmament Committee, the delegation under the leadership of Frederick Eaton[41] had to develop its

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[40] Ibid., p. 533.

[41] An outstanding negotiator, although he had had ". . . little experience in diplomatic negotiations and no experience in the field of arms control . . ." Ibid., p. 533.

own position and at the same time attempt to work in concert with our Western allies. Again, the United States was in the position of being represented by very able persons who were handicapped by lack of sufficient time and a basic disarmament program upon which to build negotiations.

The United States position was finally unveiled by Secretary of State Herter:

> . . . we have two major goals in the forthcoming negotiations.
>
> Urgently, to try to create a more stable military environment, which will curtail the risk of war and permit reductions in national armed forces and armaments.
>
> Subsequently, to cut national armed forces and armaments further, and to build up international peace-keeping machinery, to the point where aggression will be deterred by international rather than national force.
>
> These two goals are equally important . . . .[42]

The first goal of a "more stable military environment" included such objectives as reduced danger of surprise attack, controls against the spread of nuclear weapons, etc. The United States position still rested on arms control prior to the reduction of military forces. Since the Soviets had not shifted their fundamental views regarding controls and their relation to the stages of disarmament, there could be little hope of agreement. Even though the Soviet delegate placed before the Committee rather detailed proposals of inspection and control (including a proposal for the "destruction of all existing stockpiles of nuclear,

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[42] Disarmament Documents, 1960, p. 47.

chemical, and biological weapons"[43]) the United States was not in a position to respond constructively.

A review of the United States participation in disarmament negotiations since 1945 indicates that to a certain extent, policies have fluctuated without the advantage or sophistication of flexibility; yet, at the same time, these policies have often been rather inflexible without necessarily being based upon firm, fundamental decisions closely related to national goals. More simply stated, U.S. policy was one of vacillation without flexibility and rigidity without principle. Several causes for this situation can be singled out for emphasis, but in the area of government organization rather than substantive issue criticism centers on the problem of the lack of ability to relate various disarmament philosophies to national policy. Not all the vagaries of disarmament of the past sixteen years have been caused by poor organization, by any means, but it is clear that government organization has not facilitated more effective formulation of policy.

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[43] *Ibid.*, p. 109.

CHAPTER IV

THE FRAMEWORK OF DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION

Recently it has become more generally recognized that disarmament policy is an integral part of our national security policy and our foreign policy. This awareness of a more functional role for disarmament policy coincides with, or overlaps to a considerable extent, the change in the philosophy of disarmament since World War II, which places increased emphasis upon arms stabilization measures rather than reduction of armament levels as an immediate goal of disarmament. It is a reflection of the trend away from the principal historic goal of disarmament, with its focus of attention upon the economic benefits that would accrue, toward the immediate and fundamental issue of the survival of man. Military technology has progressed to such a level of destructive capability that an entirely new philosophy of arms control has developed in the United States in recent years. To many, disarmament is no longer merely a "good thing" that might produce additional funds for other sectors of the economy--it is now one of the objectives fundamental to national security and even national existence. The execution of military policy, especially in its extreme manifestation of all-out nuclear war, is no longer to be considered a servant or protector of national political goals, but rather a possible threat in itself to these goals. The function of disarmament now is to reduce the probabilities or

possibilities of nuclear war, rather than merely the capabilities of the various national entities to wage destructive war.[1]

This interlocking relationship between arms control, national defense, and foreign policy, as well as the domination of our military policy by the advance of science and technology, has in effect broadened the process of making disarmament policy from a function almost exclusively contained within the Department of State in the past, to an effort now encompassing nearly all the agencies of the Executive Branch. The magnitude of the attempts in recent years to reach an agreement with the U.S.S.R. on suspension of nuclear tests and prevention of surprise attack demonstrates not only the scope and intensity of these efforts but also the changing concept of the goals of disarmament. The suspension of nuclear tests is not a disarmament measure, or even an arms control measure in a strict sense,[2] and the prevention of surprise attack has little connection with the historic goal that seeks a reduction in the level of armed forces and weapons. Rather, these are efforts to reduce the possibilities of war through a new type of agreement: the application of mutual restraint for survival. Advocates of

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[1] Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 3.

[2] Disarmament Documents, V. II, Document 272, p. 1054; in response to a query at a press conference on June 10, 1958, Secretary Dulles stated his opinion of the significance of a test ban: "We believe that suspension of testing, in isolation, is a very inadequate measure. It does not involve any disarmament, or limitation of armament, whatsoever. To call it a 'disarmament' measure is a misnomer. All it means is that the aresenal of nuclear weapons that you have is accumulating without any exact knowledge as to what the consequences of their use would be."

these partial measures of arms control such as test bans, prevention of surprise attack and control of outer space, rely upon what is felt to be compelling interests shared by the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., interests such as reduced tension, reduced chance of accidental war, and reduced advantage accruing to a party initiating surprise attack. It should be emphasized that the new philosophy does not foresee substantial or even moderate savings through arms control, but instead notes the possibility of increased total costs because of the requirements of inspection and control connected with an arms control agreement. Thus the new disarmament philosophy has departed from the old school of economy through disarmament, not only on the pragmatic basis that sheer survival is more important than any economic benefits derived from reduced arms, but also on the basis that the new political system will superimpose international inspection and control upon the present military situation which might be expected to be "frozen" through agreement.

Some of the recent proposals and suggestions in the more sophisticated realm of arms control were briefly mentioned in Chapter III to demonstrate the "state of the art" of disarmament that faces government organizers at this time. The acquisition of certain types of weapons and weapons systems, the strategy and deployment of these weapons, the nature of the arms the United States gives to or shares with its military allies--these and many other related topics are the basic building blocks for a contemporary arms control program. Without going into a detailed discussion of strategy, alliances, "international gamesmanship," and other elements that are really the heart of many recent proposals, it should be sufficient to notice that the researcher, the policy-maker,

and the negotiator that prepare and act upon the positions of the U.S. Government in disarmament matters must both represent and have extensive knowledge of all facets of national power.

This calls for an agency of the government that is able to represent not only the major departments of the Executive Branch, but also the will of the American people as expressed in the Congress. A reading of the literature of the last several years that deals with the disarmament issue would indicate that there has been practically no coordination or cooperation among the several agencies. Some statements supporting the establishment by Congress of a United States Disarmament Agency for World Peace and Security in 1961 tended to indicate that there has been no such mutual, cooperative effort. Actually, there has been extensive coordination between State, Defense, the AEC, and others--not all completely harmonious and effective, of course. Personnel from the major departments indicate both officially and unofficially their satisfaction with the "open channels" between State and the other agencies. On the substantive issues there is often strong disagreement, of course, as each department looks to what it considers its primary responsibilities and interests.

The issue should not be whether there has been coordination among the governmental agencies, and not even whether this coordination has been sufficient,[3] because no one will ever admit sufficiency in such a

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[3] Senator Humphrey, for example, has complained about the operation of "executive privilege" by President Eisenhower in not releasing the eight reports compiled by Stassen's disarmament advisers in 1955 and 1956, a compendium which Governor Stassen hailed as a detailed

human enterprise; the issue instead should be whether the existing coordination has been directed along the most fruitful channels. Has a locus of disarmament expertise within the government been established? Is there in existence a body of experts in this field representative of all departments concerned that is able to clarify and resolve for the President's decision the basic issues of disarmament policy? Is there a research endeavor sufficiently detached from the other agencies that can provide technical advice and thorough political studies? These and many other tests should be applied to answer in part the question of the direction of inter-agency coordination.

Basic issues and conflict would by necessity have to be thrashed out at the highest level, with decisions on many subjects deferred to the President. At first glance, the National Security Council might appear to be the body that could best perform this function. Yet, despite the obvious limitations (which are often exaggerated) of any interdepartmental committee effort, the National Security Council has other limitations. Its meetings are attended regularly by persons who have little immediate concern with disarmament *per se*, such as the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Budget, etc. For this reason, as well as the fact that the National Security Council has usually been overburdened with "routine" matters, it has been often the practice to

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operating manual for disarmament. This is one example of an age-old battle between the Executive and the Congress that is not restricted to disarmament matters.

resolve high-level disarmament matters outside the National Security Council, despite substantial comment to the contrary.[4]

The result was neither a void in interdepartmental cooperation nor a complete reliance upon informal channels of communication. President Truman had established an interdepartmental Regulation of Armaments Committee, consisting of the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. Most of the work on disarmament matters at this time was done at a staff level, however, and the principal members "met infrequently."[5] It should be borne in mind that this was a sterile period for disarmament, with an ever-increasing

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[4] The White House press release of March 19, 1955, announcing the appointment of Mr. Stassen as Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament, noted that the "broad studies, investigations, and conclusions" of Mr. Stassen's staff must be concurred in by the National Security Council before they ". . . became basic policy toward the question of disarmament." In a radio and television report to the nation by Secretary Dulles on July 22, 1957, on the subject of Disarmament and Peace, the Secretary stated that "The Substantive decisions (of disarmament) are made by President Eisenhower, after taking account of the views represented on the National Security Council." Yet in actual practice, although the National Security Council often has--and does--discuss disarmament and its relationship with national security policy, the National Security Council has not developed basic disarmament policy as such. Perhaps a "line of least resistance" has been followed, with policy being developed at State with informal support and coordination from Defense and the AEC. This has been suggested by Saville Davis, "Recent Policy Making in the United States Government," Donald G. Brennan, ed., Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security (New York: George Braziller, 1961), p. 388. Mr. Davis states that ". . . when Mr. Dulles wanted help he chose it from his own staff, from the Disarmanent Division of the State Department. Dulles never let this subject become implicated in the processes of the National Security Council."

[5] Ibid., p. 387. Also see Subcommittee on Disarmament, Armaments, pp. 104-5 for a brief description of the Executive Committee for the Reduction of Armaments (RAC).

level of international tension leading up to the Korean war and the rearming by the Western powers. Disarmament and other related studies were still undertaken, but a high degree of enthusiasm and confidence was not in evidence. Also, the center of disarmament negotiations at this time was more within, rather than outside, the United Nations, where perhaps more productive negotiations could have been conducted.

It has often been stated that the mid-1950's was our "one good opportunity" to establish effective international inspection and control of existing armaments, with an implementation of disarmament by stages. This period has passed; and as the subject of arms control has been politically more popular, criticism of the Eisenhower Administration for its ineffective disarmament efforts has become prevalent. Some of the bases of this criticism have already been mentioned; it is the purpose at this time to examine the general development of our organizational framework from 1953 to the summer of 1961.

The first year or two of the Eisenhower Administration were involved with concluding operations in Korea and redefining military policy, and with the exception of the Eisenhower "Atoms for Peace" proposal, these years were rather devoid of serious disarmament activity. Several events previously noted led up to the appointment of Governor Stassen in March, 1955, as Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament. There is no determining the most significant of these events, but one development of primary importance was undoubtedly the very strong feelings of the President in favor of determined attempts to reach agreement with the Soviet Union over control of the arms race. Whether one agrees with a fairly common opinion that more should have

been done during this period, it is obvious that there was an extensive departure from the previous course of disarmament activities in the government.

The White House press release of March 19, 1955, broadly defined Mr. Stassen's position and responsibilities

> . . . for developing, on behalf of the President and the State Department, the broad studies, investigations, and conclusions, which, when concurred in . . . will become basic policy toward the question of disarmament.[6]

The role of the Congress was recognized:

> When indicated as desirable or appropriate under our constitutional processes, concurrences will be secured from the Congress prior to specific action or pronouncement of policy.[7]

However, this was a rather begrudging admission of the prerogatives of the Congress, as indicated by the "desirable or appropriate" qualification. Congressional-Executive cooperation in the disarmament field has been slow in developing despite efforts by both branches of the government. As the importance and political significance of the subject grew, however, the amount of contact and cooperation between the two branches increased so that by 1961 they could be described as satisfactory. By this time, the Subcommittee on Disarmament under the competent leadership of Senator Humphrey had made its influence felt on the several agencies within the Executive; at the same time, a small body of disarmament experts was developing in these agencies and channels of communication were established among them and with the Congress.

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[6] White House Press Release, March 19, 1955.

[7] Ibid.

A change in the international scene of great importance was briefly recognized in the press release:

> The recent session of the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations has again resulted in no progress and no clear crystallization of thinking on this subject.[8]

Perhaps unwittingly, this statement illuminated the impending shift in the locus of disarmament negotiations primarily from the United Nations to multilateral conferences outside the scope of the United Nations. Gradually, the size of disarmament conferences were to be numerically reduced until, in the spring of 1961, it was reported that the United States and the Soviet Union would hold bilateral talks. Although there is still much disarmament debate in the General Assembly, the influence of the United Nations in disarmament matters had been eclipsed, at least temporarily.

The broad scope of disarmament policy was also noted in the press release of March 19, 1955. Governor Stassen was:

> . . . expected to take into account the full implications of new weapons in the possession of other nations as well as the United States, to consider future probabilities of armaments, and to weigh the views of the military, the civilians, and the officials of our Government and of other governments.[9]

Although Mr. Stassen was given cabinet rank by the President to emphasize the importance given to this new position, he was not put at the head of an independent agency but was instead given a hybrid staff of modest proportions, and a rather nebulous relationship with the Department of State:

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[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

> In the spring of 1955, the President specified the responsibilities of the Special Assistant and his working relationships with other parts of the executive branch. In August of 1955 the latter was informed that he would be Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission to sit for the United States in the Subcommittee of said Commission. In that capacity Mr. Stassen was to serve under the direction of Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., the United States Representative to the United Nations. If the Special Assistant dealt with other nations outside the framework of the United Nations, he would work under Mr. Dulles. In other aspects of his duties, he would report to the President.[10]

Mr. Stassen's connections with the major departments of the Executive Branch, through direct communication as well as the National Security Council, his direct access to the President and his cabinet status enhanced the prestige of the position of the Special Assistant for Disarmament.

Mr. Stassen had a large order to fill without substantial financial and personnel support. A body of nine officials composed of selected persons from the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Atomic Energy Commission, the International Cooperation Administration, and the Central Intelligence Agency formed his immediate staff.

> Members of the staff assist Mr. Stassen on the basis of their experience in their own agencies but they do not represent or bind their parent agencies. They are not representatives of the executive agencies as are the members of the President's Special Committee. As a matter of practice, however, the members of the Special Assistant's staff keep in touch with the action officers handling disarmament questions in their own departments and agencies.[11]

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[10] Subcommittee on Disarmament, *Armaments*, p. 107.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 109.

This is the first example in the field of disarmament of experts being loaned from one agency to another in order to supply technical advice, and not to represent the parent agency. In some respects, perhaps, these special advisers are orphans cut off from their parent department and not fully utilized in their new positions. Their status and value has gradually improved in recent years, however.

Also created was the President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems, mentioned in the quotation above. The Special Committee was composed of representatives of the following departments and agencies: State, Defense (and the Joint Chiefs of Staff), AEC, Justice, CIA, and USIA. The Special Committee was not established with the specific charge of formulating basic U.S. disarmament policy; instead, its purpose was "to provide maximum effectiveness in carrying forward a concentrated endeavor to reach a sound disarmament agreement under effective safeguards," to keep the represented agencies informed, and serve "as a medium of exchange of views."[12] Staff preparation for the Special Committee was accomplished by the Disarmament Staff.

This organization still left a gaping hole in the area of long-range research for disarmament within the government. This hole was partly plugged in early October, 1955, by the creation of eight task forces by Mr. Stassen for the review of U.S. disarmament policy.[13]

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[12] Ibid., p. 108.

[13] Ibid., pp. 109-10. These task forces undertook research in the following areas: nuclear inspection, aerial inspection, inspection of navies and navy aircraft and missiles, inspection of army and ground force units, and inspection of the steel industry, industry in general,

Commendable and timely as this effort was, it should be recognized that the eight task forces were concentrated in the technical fields of inspection of nuclear installations, military units, and industry. This concentration on the technical aspects of an arms control agreement is symptomatic of the disarmament efforts of the United States, at least during most of the negotiations. There seems to be almost an obsession with the "practical," a desire to devise what appears to be a "fair" control system that is sure to appeal to the other nations. Yet the United States seriously neglects the necessary fundamental studies in the realm of ideologies and disarmament philosophies of other states, and does not effectively relate disarmament to national goals.

It is impossible, of course, to define an "unchanging" fundamental goal or national interest, but a thorough study and enunciation of political objectives by a competent, representative organization composed of an elite group of statesmen could provide the guidelines, or the basic direction for the separate disarmament agencies and committees. There are serious problems involved in attempting such a definition of political objectives, and these problems would have to be recognized and adjusted to as effectively as possible. Individual Congressmen, for example, are hardly going to be bound by any set of values and objectives prescribed by the Executive Branch. This is as it should be, because the members of Congress must be effective representatives of the public view.

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budget economies, and methods of communication for a system of inspection and control.

An excellent example of the conflict between operating disarmament decisions and political objectives is the bearing that military strategy and weapons have on disarmament policy. Current discussion of arms control often centers on the theory of stabilized deterrent, for example, as a means of reducing international tension and the chance of war by accident or miscalculation. United States military policy since shortly after World War II has been primarily one of deterrence, but often weapons systems and strategy tend to create an unstable situation, according to the proponents of arms stabilization. Bombers on airborne alert, dependent upon perfect communications and the proper functioning of the "fail-safe" system, exemplify the "hair trigger" factor that needs to be constrained without reducing the element of deterrence and its effect. It appears that the present Administration employs the concept of stable deterrence. An example of this is the decision not to produce the B-70 (or RS-70) at this time, although international stability probably was not the principle factor in this particular decision.[14]

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[14] Secretary of Defense McNamara has elaborated on our basic military deterrent posture: "Essentially, there are two major approaches available to us: (1) develop forces which can be launched within the expected period of tactical warning, roughly 15 minutes; (2) develop forces which can ride out a massive ICBM attack . . . .

Accordingly, in reevaluating our general war position, our major concern was to reduce our dependence on deterrent forces which are highly vulnerable to ballistic missile attack or which rely for their survival on a hair-trigger response to the first indications of such an attack. Conversely, we sought to place greater emphasis on the second approach--the kind of forces which could ride out a massive nuclear attack and which could be applied with deliberation and always under the complete control of the constituted authority." United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1962, Hearings before Subcommittee, 87th Congress,

This has been merely one example of the close relationship between military strategy and modern arms control. Even more critical decisions are required, in the opinion of this writer, in political matters. It was mentioned in Chapter I that, although we use the term "inspection and control" rather loosely, most systems of inspection that are discussed really do not delve deeply into the problem of control, or the political problem of how violations or suspected violations are to be handled. There is a need for a government organization that can reasonably cope with these fundamental issues. Recent action taken by the previous and the present administrations indicate that the problem has been recognized and is being approached with constructive endeavor.

There was formed in 1959 a group known as the "Committee of Principals," composed of the heads of departments and agencies that were concerned principally with disarmament matters. This Committee consists of the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. The function of the Committee of Principals is usually mentioned in terms of coordination rather than formulation of disarmament policy. It is a little known body that meets at the call of the Secretary of State, but has no secretariat, no funds, and no formal schedule.

The activities of the Committee of Principals are not publicized. Although it is to be hoped that the Principals have grappled with the

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1st Session, on H.R. 7851, April 18-July 26, 1961 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 5.

fundamental issues of disarmament and its relation to the security of the nation, it seems probable that the Committee has been reduced to a trading mart for reconciling opposing views on specific issues of arms control policy, rather than the formulation of theoretical political concepts.[15]

A positive step toward the development of a more effective organization was the establishment of the Disarmament Administration in September, 1960. Although the Disarmament Administration was not considered a prototype for the Disarmament Agency proposed to Congress in June, 1961, much operational experience was gained in the year the Disarmament Administration functioned. The Disarmament Administration and its successor are treated in Chapters V and VIII.

It may be recalled that the center of disarmament planning shifted from the White House back to the Department of State after Mr. Stassen's resignation in early 1958. From this time until the formation of the Disarmament Administration, disarmament planning at State was conducted in the office of the Special Assistant for Disarmament and Atomic Energy. Although specific coordination was spelled out for Mr. Stassen's post at the White House and the Department of State, it was felt by many that more effective development of policy would ensue

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[15] For a brief treatment of the Committee see Strengthening the Government for Arms Control (Washington: National Planning Association, 1960), pp. 16-17. After a short discussion of the weaknesses of committee efforts in the government, and especially the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the report notes that "an interdepartmental 'Committee of Principals' is now used in arms control policy planning and the results are not satisfactory."

with the disarmament office physically and administratively linked with the Department of State.

Coordination among the various departments and agencies remained relatively the same after the establishment of the Disarmament Administration. The Committee of Principals was still the primary body that collectively represented the disarmament community. It is important to note that, although the principal executive departments exchange a number of personnel to provide technical advice, different views, etc., these persons are not supposed to represent their parent agencies; and as their exchange tour progresses, they tend to broaden their parochial outlook to a certain extent. Yet, there is probably no way of substantially diminishing inter-departmental coordination through the establishment of a new agency.

This has been a sketch of the broad picture of disarmament organization. The following chapters will treat specific departments in more detail.

CHAPTER V

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The primary responsibility for the development of disarmament policy, with the exception of the office of the Presidency and the first two years of Mr. Stassen's role, has always been in the Department of State. This is a realization, tacit or otherwise, that disarmament is merely one segment of foreign policy. To be sure, disarmament contains problems peculiar to itself. It has always been an emotional issue, with many international implications. It is closely related to military strategy. And it is a technical problem as well as a political one, with no effective separation of the two. If there has been any firm basis to U.S. disarmament policy since World War II, it has been our insistence upon effective international inspection and control of armaments, and this in itself is a highly technical problem.[1] Yet, as has been mentioned earlier, any technical problem eventually resolves into a political question or issue: in the area of inspection and control, for example, the political issue is basically a matter of risk. The technical experts may decide that a 10-kiloton weapon, as an example, exploded underground may be detected as a weapon at a distance of 100 miles with perhaps a 75 per cent or 85 per cent probability. The

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[1] Subcommittee on Disarmament, Armaments, pp. 78-79 lists several constants of U.S. disarmament policy. The first constant was that no "reliable disarmament agreement can be reached unless it is completely covered by an inspection and reporting system adequate to verify reductions and guard against surprise attack."

decision whether to base an agreement on this probability then becomes a matter of risk acceptability. The political expert at State, or the ultimate authority at the White House, is charged with the responsibility of balancing the two risk curves against each other: the present risk of nuclear war in an arms race, versus the potential risk that an opponent may be able to cheat successfully, once in a while, under any inspection system. In other words, technical problems, which have so often come under the purview of other departments such as Defense and the AEC, eventually are dwarfed by the larger political issues, which fall within the ambit of State responsibility.

As has been noted, international disarmament negotiations were largely confined to the United Nations in the decade or so following World War II.[2] Perhaps for this reason as well as any other, the office within the State Department charged with developing, coordinating, and implementing U.S. disarmament policy was the Office of United Nations Affairs, which was later known as the Bureau of International Affairs. Whenever extensive negotiations were contemplated or in progress, ad hoc groups of policy makers as well as negotiators were assembled. Some of these were from the Department of State, some from other agencies, and often some were selected from citizens not actively engaged in government work. These last were usually quite competent persons,

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[2] Much of the information on the development of disarmament organization within the State Department is taken from Appendix C to Report on S. 2180, Creating a United States Disarmament Agency for World Peace and Security, /n.d./, prepared by the Office of the Adviser to the President on Disarmament, hereafter cited as Report on S. 2180.

distinguished in their non-governmental professions. The daily operations within the Department of State that related to disarmanent, however, were relegated to a small group of four or five professionals located in the Bureau of International Affairs.

In these early days, arms control efforts were centered on various approaches to controlling atomic energy. The Acheson Committee of Five was selected in January, 1946, to prepare a program for the international control of atomic energy. A group of consultants under the leadership of Mr. David Lilienthal was appointed later that month to work on the same subject in connection with the Acheson Committee. Their combined efforts produced the "Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy" in March, 1946. This report was generally known as the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan that was to serve as the basis of the Baruch proposal presented to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission later that year.

The Acheson-Lilienthal group was the first *ad hoc* task force on disarmament; and although it was also the only such group established prior to 1955, it set a precedent in disarmament organization that was to be followed extensively in later years. Although *ad hoc* groups were employed in practically all aspects of disarmament, their use was centered in the panels of technical experts and negotiating teams. Some of the strongest criticism of the government's disarmament efforts has been directed toward the method of selecting and preparing an *ad hoc* group for an international disarmament conference. In the past, some negotiating teams have had as little as a month or so to get acquainted with each other, become familiar with the subject of the talks, and

prepare the United States position. Much has been made of the lack of continuity in U.S. negotiating teams (as well as the planners and policy makers) and it is reasonable to assume that the failure to weld a cohesive group of technical experts and negotiators has resulted in weaker policy and negotiating positions. Whether it has also been responsible in any way for lack of progress is open to question.[3]

An excellent description of our organization during this period of ten or so years after World War II states that:

> During most of this period, there was no central administrative unit in which responsibility for the planning and coordination of disarmament policy was focused. Personnel engaged in disarmament studies or planning were scattered among a number of departments and agencies. The total staff specializing in disarmament problems was small. In the Department of State, where primary responsibility for policy lay, the disarmament staff usually comprised no more than 4 professionals. For the development of policy plans as well as technical studies, the Government was heavily dependent upon *ad hoc* committees. In the conduct of negotiations, limited staff made it difficult to maintain continuity in American representation. From 1946 on, United States delegations to various disarmament conferences were led by some 16 different chiefs.[4]

The report continues:

> Between 1946 and 1955 the United States was represented at more than 40 international conferences at which disarmament was discussed. Among the first of these were meetings of the UN Atomic Energy Commission in 1946, at which Mr. Bernard M. Baruch presented the American proposals for international control of

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[3] In a speech at Phillips Andover Academy, Andover, Massachusetts, on February 25, 1961, John J. McCloy paid high tribute to the leaders of our negotiating teams in the past, and added: "In my judgment, the delays and frustrations that have plagued the negotiations thus far have been due more to the great difficulties of the problem than to any inadequacies of plans or planners." Department of State, *Press Release No. 88*, February 24, 1961.

[4] *Report on S. 2180*, Appendix C, p. 1.

> atomic energy. In addition to UNAEC, the UN forums created for disarmament were the UN Commission for Conventional Armaments, established in 1947, the UN Disarmament Commission, established in 1952 and representing the merger of UNAEC and UNCCA; and beginning in 1954, the UN Disarmament Subcommittee composed of the "powers principally involved." Over this period, there were ten principal United States Representatives to disarmament negotiations conducted by these UN bodies.[5]

The early years after the war, then, were characterized by the concentration of effort to attempt to reach an agreement on the international control of atomic energy. As the antagonism between the U.S.S.R. and the West mounted and the Soviets made it clear they would have nothing to do with the Baruch Plan, disarmament efforts stagnated. For several years, the Disarmament Staff at the Department of State was fairly constant in its complement of six or less full-time persons.

This was, despite its size, a capable, experienced staff, and it was put to use by Secretary Dulles to a greater extent than previously. It was characteristic of Mr. Dulles to hold as closely as possible the reins of disarmament policy, as well as foreign policy in general. This resulted in a reduced utilization of the National Security Council and the Regulation of Armaments Committee.[6]

When Mr. Stassen was appointed as Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament in March, 1955, the responsibility for disarmament policy shifted to the White House, at least for the first two years of Mr. Stassen's tenure. There was a considerable flurry of activity in these years, centered around Stassen's Disarmament Staff,

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[5] Ibid., p. 3.

[6] Donald G. Brennan (ed.), Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security (New York: George Braziller, 1961), p. 388.

the President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems, and the eight task forces dealing with the technical problems of inspection and control.

However, in March of 1957, Stassen and his Deputy Special Assistant were transferred to the Department of State.

> Mr. Stassen's office in State, S/DA, was charged with the responsibility of working, under the Secretary's direction, on negotiations with other governments on disarmament. Mr. Stassen's transfer to the State Department was made just days prior to his departure for London for the Disarmament Subcommittee meetings. After the London meetings Mr. Stassen returned to Washington in September 1957 and remained in his position until he resigned in February 1958. The organizational unit responsible to his office was disbanded at this time.[7]

No official reason has been given for this momentous change. It would be easy to seize upon internal struggles as the background for Stassen's transfer to the control of the Secretary of State, even though the disarmament policy battle within the Administration was not publicly noted at length until two months later.[8] More likely, the reason for the shift was to coordinate the preparation of U.S. negotiating positions more effectively within the government and with allies, although internal Administration battles probably were of some importance.[9]

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[7] Report on S. 2180, Appendix C, p. 5.

[8] See Chalmers M. Roberts, "Stassen Undercut on Arms Control," The Washington Post, June 3, 1957, p. 17; and David Lawrence "Mystery of Stassen's Boner," The Evening Star (Washington), June 14, 1957, p. 20. In a speech by Senator Kennedy at the University of New Hampshire, March 7, 1960, the Senator stated that "Mr. Stassen's efforts as a special disarmament negotiator were consistently undercut and opposed in the Pentagon, AEC, and State Department, ignored in the White House." State, Disarmament Documents, 1960, p. 63.

[9] The Subcommittee on Disarmament, in its report on Control and Reduction of Armaments, p. 15, noted that "there is as a result, less chance that the United States will appear abroad as speaking with two, and sometimes conflicting, voices on disarmament questions." Also, on

Following the transfer of disarmament responsibility from the White House to the Department of State, the organization situation stabilized for a period of nearly two and one-half years, and served as a working model for the later development of the U.S. Disarmament Administration in several respects. The following official description of the organization during this period cannot be improved upon for conciseness and brevity:

> Following the resignation of Mr. Stassen, the Secretary of State announced on February 27, 1958, the designation of Ambassador James J. Wadsworth to act, under the Secretary's direction, as United States representative in future disarmament negotiations. At this time steps were also taken to expand the Department's administrative machinery for disarmament:
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> 1) A high-level advisory group was named to consult with the Secretary on disarmament policy. General Alfred M. Gruenther, Mr. Robert A. Lovett, Mr. John J. McCloy, and General Walter Bedell Smith were requested by the Secretary to serve in this capacity.
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> 2) The responsibility for policy and substantive aspects of disarmament was transferred from the Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO) to the Special Assistant for Atomic Energy Affairs (S/AE). The change was announced on March 27, 1958. Mr. Philip J. Farley, head of S/AE, was given the new title of Special Assistant for Disarmament and Atomic Energy. The disarmament section of S/AE, which in 1957 had numbered four officers, was assigned additional staff and funds. By fiscal year 1960 the disarmament staff of S/AE numbered 20 positions.

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p. 65, the report discussed the reason for the transfer of this office to State: "The operation of the Office of Special Assistant did have its drawbacks, however. Disarmament policy appeared to be formulated without achieving the best possible coordination with the Department of State and, therefore, tended to be divorced from other and related aspects of foreign policy. Furthermore, there were times when the President's Disarmament Assistant and other officials of the executive branch made conflicting statements about American proposals and this resulted in confusion as to United States' policy."

3) Mr. Charles A. Coolidge was named by the Secretary of State on July 29, 1959, to head a Joint Disarmament Study, on behalf of the Departments of State and Defense. He was directly responsible to the Secretary of State.

The Coolidge group was to "consider comprehensive and partial measures of arms control and reduction which if internationally agreed would contribute to the achievement of United States national security objectives." Their report was originally to be submitted by April 1960 but because of the prospective Ten-Nation disarmament talks its completion was requested by the end of 1959. The report, which was dated January 1960, was prepared as a working paper for submission jointly to the Secretaries of State and Defense.

Mr. Coolidge's full time professional staff totalled 17 persons including a civilian deputy, a military deputy and a technical deputy. Six officers from State, five from Defense, and one each from AEC, CIA, and IDA were included on the staff. In addition to a full-time staff, part-time assistance was given by six research associates from institutions such as the Rand Corporation, Stanford Research Institute and the Operations Research Organization.[10]

It was earlier stated that after the failure of the disarmament negotiations in August, 1957, the negotiations bogged down the next year on the subject of surprise attack and a ban on nuclear tests. In the period 1958 to 1960, it became increasingly obvious that negotiations on such highly technical subjects required extensive research, continuity of personnel and objectives, and an agency close to both the President and the Secretary of State. There were other reasons, also, for the promulgation, on September 9, 1960, of the order establishing the United States Disarmament Administration, but the essential motivation was the realization that arms control had become a very complicated, expensive, painstaking process requiring a high level of competence and coordination; that success was not to be gained in the next few months

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[10] Report on S. 2180, Appendix C, pp. 5-6.

or perhaps even years but the seriousness still demanded the effort; and, that perhaps U.S. disarmament policy in the past had not been as thoroughly prepared as it might have been.

Accordingly, the announcement of the establishment of the new Disarmament Administration stated that

> The Administration will be responsible to the Secretary of State and will be staffed with personnel drawn from other agencies and from outside government as well as from the Department of State.
>
> In addition to coordinating an intensified program of study and research, the new organization will be responsible for formulating policy recommendations for consideration within the U.S. Government with respect to the limitation and control, by international agreement, of armed forces and weapons of all kinds and for the direction and support of international negotiations on these matters.
>
> It will marshal in a single unit political, military, scientific and technical skills in a continuing effort to discover reliable means for easing the burden of armaments, lessening the dangers of war by miscalculation, and helping to promote a just and durable peace.[11]

The disarmament functions in the Office of the Special Assistant for Disarmament and Atomic Energy were transferred to the new Administration shortly after its creation. The importance of its role in policy formulation is indicated by its mission:

> . . . to assist the Secretary of State in formulating disarmament and arms control policies and basic positions consistent with national security for consideration within the United States Government, and in negotiating international agreements in this field.[12]

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[11] Department of State, Press Release No. 520, September 9, 1960.

[12] Department of State, Organization of the United States Disarmament Administration, Department Circular Number 370, October 12, 1960, p. 1.

The Disarmament Administration was the first significant attempt to gather together in one agency the personnel, material support, and organizational capability required to generate basic, long-range disarmament policy, develop a body of experts, establish a source of negotiating teams, coordinate the activities of the other agencies, and supervise the implementation of disarmament policy. Its success can be fairly measured in these terms alone.

Although the Disarmament Administration was responsible to the Secretary of State, it enjoyed an informal and semi-autonomous status with its own administrative unit, separate budget, and access to the President through the relationship between the Agency and the Office of Adviser to the President on Disarmament:

> Mr. McCloy was to make recommendations to the President on the formulation of U.S. policy on disarmament and also on the organization of the staff within the Government which was to have primary responsibility for disarmament. The staff of USDA as well as personnel from other agencies were made available to him in the discharge of his responsibilities.[13]

The Administration was headed by a Director, a Deputy Director, and an Assistant Deputy Director. There was both an Administrative Section and a Secretariat to handle personnel and other functions of an administrative nature.

The Disarmament Administration was responsible to the Secretary of State through the Under Secretary; a second channel of communication upward was provided by the close relation between the Administration and the Office of the Adviser to the President on Disarmament. The Adviser

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[13] Report on S. 2180, Appendix C, p. 7.

was assisted in the Disarmament Agency by a small section known as the Staff. The three or four members of the Staff, in addition to serving as a link between the Administration and the Office of the Adviser to the President, provided continuity and meaningful direction to the operations of the Disarmament Administration.

In addition to the offices just mentioned, there were four principal sections of the Disarmament Administration: Public Information, Policy, Political, and Studies. Unfortunately, disarmament policy is not developed in such clearly defined segments, and in actual practice the last three sections have functioned so closely together that it is nearly meaningless to attempt to define their separate missions.

The purpose of the Public Information Office is apparent in its title, especially regarding its functions with the news media. Beyond the usual scope of public affairs, the Public Information Office fulfilled the important function of working closely with the United States Information Agency to ensure thorough coverage of United States disarmament policy abroad.

The Studies section provided the basic background material for the work done in the Policy and Political sections. The Studies section was further subdivided into subsections entitled Projects and Research. A recurring complaint of the disarmament program of the United States Government in the past has been directed not necessarily at the quantity of research undertaken within the government, but at the locus of this research. Most of the disarmament research has been conducted for the Department of State by the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy

Commission,[14] two agencies considered by many critics not to be too enthusiastic about efforts toward disarmament. The Studies section of the Disarmament Administration consisted of about sixteen persons, not including clerical assistance. Increased research activity at the Department of State has not been intended to duplicate or replace the technical research facilities available in the Department of Defense or the Atomic Energy Commission, except perhaps on a very limited laboratory scale. Research facilities within the Disarmament Administration would be limited in physical size and scope of operation, designed primarily to coordinate the research studies of the other agencies.

The Policy section was primarily responsible for the development of basic United States disarmament policy, employing the research and studies production to establish the fundamental policies that formed the basis of the more specific negotiating positions developed by the Political section. The Political section might well be termed the operating section of the Administration. The Political section was headed by a Director and Deputy Director; the Political section provided not only current negotiating positions but also provided most of the officers for the delegations empowered to conduct negotiations. Within this section there were divisions for both Nuclear Test Negotiations and General Disarmament, each headed by an Officer-in-Charge.

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[14] For example, the United States Disarmament Agency had $400,000 to spend on "studies" for fiscal year 1961, whereas the Department of Defense has been allocated approximately $60,000,000 for Project Vela alone.

A recognition of the need for greater disarmament efforts within the United States Government, particularly in the research and studies area, is indicated by the rapid growth of disarmament activities in the Department of State in 1960 and 1961. Testifying before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee in June, 1961, Mr. Edmund A. Gullion, the Deputy Director (and acting Director) of the Disarmament Agency, commented that

> We have authorized 38 positions. In order to get the work done, we have had to borrow the services of outside consultants and rely upon people lent to us by other agencies. We now have at work actually both officer and clerical, 86 people plus 18 consultants from outside.[15]

From a total of twenty positions in 1960 in the Office of the Special Assistant for Disarmament and Atomic Energy, the disarmament efforts expanded to an authorized level of thirty-eight positions in 1961 but an actual force level of eighty-six. It was anticipated that the personnel strength of the new Agency for World Peace and Security would gradually increase to approximately two hundred and fifty. Although research activities will continue to consume a major portion of this increase, there is no anticipated decrease in the research programs in support of disarmament that are conducted by agencies other than the Department of State. The facilities possessed by the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission, in particular, cannot be duplicated in any practicable manner.

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[15] United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Departments of State, Justice, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations, 1962, Hearings Before Subcommittee, 87th Congress, 1st Session, on H.R. 7331, June 13-July 11, 1961 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 97.

The improvement in the organization of the United States Government for disarmament rests not simply in these numerical increases just mentioned, but rather in recognition of the leading role of the Department of State both in formulating disarmament policy and in coordinating the disarmament functions of other agencies.

CHAPTER VI

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

As a result of several factors, including (1) the present emphasis on arms control vice conventional disarmament; (2) the technical requirements of international inspection systems; and (3) the relationship of arms control to military strategy, the Department of Defense (DOD) has played an ever-increasing role in both the support of research and the shaping of disarmament policy. There have been efforts to improve governmental organization for arms control, especially in the coordination of the views of the separate departments, and efforts to reduce the amount of reliance of the President and the Secretary of State upon the conclusions reached in technical research projects that have been produced under the supervision of the DOD. Inherent in these attempts to improve organization is the recognition that no effective organization for arms control can omit the participation of the DOD in the formulation of disarmament policy. Military policy and arms control policy are too closely linked to attempt to study the one without at the same time examining the requirements of the other. Attempts to increase the efficacy of our arms control organization become, then, at least in part, a matter of prescribing the role of the DOD in the formulation of arms control policy within the general context of the security of the United States.

Since disarmament policy is an integral part of national security policy, the Department of Defense has been an interested party to any disarmament matter that might have been discussed by the National

Security Council (NSC) since its inception in 1947. Problems of disarmament became so unique soon after World War II that President Truman formed the Reduction of Armaments Committee, composed of representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, and the Atomic Energy Commission. Whereas the NSC was the body charged with the treatment of the broad implications of disarmament policy upon defense policy, and *vice versa*, the Reduction of Armaments Committee was more like an inner council charged with the development of specific disarmament policy. It is not inaccurate to suggest that the Reduction of Armaments Committee, in a manner similar to the NSC, became a group of persons interested primarily not in the positive aspects of developing national policy but rather in the negative role of reconciling divergencies of opinion among the departments concerned. The result was, as has often been alleged, not decisive policy decisions but more often compromises that offended no department and permitted each individual agency a maximum degree of independence in its interpretation of disarmament policy.

This is, of course, similar to much of the criticism of the decision-making process of any committee such as the National Security Council or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for example. Such criticism is valid if two conditions exist: (1) there is a strong divergency of opinion among the committee members; and (2) there is not sufficiently strong leadership directing the committee effort that will overcome the parochial views of the members, while at the same time allowing maximum discussion of these divergent views. Effective policy making depends upon this type of leadership regardless of the nature of the group effort.

Within the government there is recognition of the conservative view of the Department of Defense toward disarmament. The military think naturally in terms of military operations when considering national security, and it is not necessarily strange that their outlook sometimes clashes with policy makers at the Department of State who are charged with the responsibility of foreign policy and disarmament policy. The problem becomes one of reconciling conflicts of opinion rather than technical issues. The primary purpose of this paper is to question whether there has been sufficient effort in the past to revise the organization of our government for arms control so that these issues can be discussed to the fullest extent, resulting in the formulation of basic policy that will serve as a foundation in disarmament negotiation.

The disarmament effort within the Department of Defense has not been as centralized as at the Department of State. Not only are the three services individually concerned with disarmament issues, but the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and many other subdivisions become equally involved. The aggregate represents a mammoth organization whose complexity seems to defy significant change or even comprehensive analysis by an outside observer. Yet there is a very distinct "disarmament community" within the Department of Defense (where the term arms control is preferred to disarmament) that has well-established channels of communication internally as well as outside the department. Decentralization of disarmament policy making in the DOD among the various agencies and the three services does not necessarily result in a confusion of disarmament opinion. The three military services, for example, share a rather similar basic attitude toward the

interrelation between military policy and arms control policy. Views of the services on disarmament are not separately presented and advocated within the DOD hierarchy after the individual service views are coordinated within the internal procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Exceptions, such as divergent policies originating in the JCS or the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), must be resolved at a higher level, usually in the Committee of Principals.

I. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Secretary of Defense should be the personification of the disarmament philosophy of his department. If he believes strongly in the immediate goal of an international system of arms control, and the ultimate goal of disarmament, these beliefs will be reflected in the policies of his department. Since arms control is a dominant philosophy at this time, and the concept of stable deterrence is at the heart of most of the arms control proposals of the United States Government, the views held by the Secretary of Defense on weapons and weapons systems, deployment of forces, combat alerts, and other similar attributes of military readiness have direct influence on disarmament policy.

The Secretary of Defense may express his disarmament philosophy not only within his department, but also at the meetings of the National Security Council and the Committee of Principals, and in consultation with the President. Although the Secretary has not been personally questioned by the Congress regarding his views on disarmament, his testimony before the Appropriations Committee reflects his adherence to the stable deterrent theory.

II. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

The central authority for arms control matters within the Department of Defense is the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD/ISA). ISA acts as a clearing house for arms control projects in DOD, and is responsible for coordination with other departments in the Executive Branch. Requests for DOD disarmament studies and policy statements come to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), from the Office of the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (or other agencies in the Executive Branch, such as the Atomic Energy Commission). In official language, ISA is the "Single Agent for Interdepartmental Contact and Defense Coordination."[1]

Within this office there are two subdivisions that are concerned with disarmament matters: the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Arms Control (formerly called Disarmament and Military Affairs), and the Office of the Director of Disarmament (previously known as the Office of Disarmament and United Nations Affairs). The first office mentioned assists the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) on the broad policy matters related to disarmament. This office was formerly occupied by a military officer of high rank on active duty, but in 1961 it was transferred to a civilian, perhaps as a reflection of the

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[1] Defense Organization for Arms Control Affairs, Organization chart published by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, November 2, 1960.

desire of the President to strengthen civilian direction of the Department of Defense.

The Office of Director of Disarmament is staffed by representatives of the three services, of the grade of colonel/captain. This office serves as the hub of the disarmament activities within DOD, and is responsible for the general coordination of DOD disarmament programs. It should be noted, however, that the access of the three military services to the Office of the Secretary of Defense via the ASD/ISA is paralleled by the chain of command from the Joint Staff to the Secretary of Defense via the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. This access to the Secretary of Defense is seldom, if ever, employed by the individual services in disarmament matters.

The formal routing of disarmament matters within the DOD, especially those requests that are received from the Department of State, is as follows (see Appendix I): the project or request is received by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; the project is studied in the Office for Arms Control (formerly called the Office for Disarmament and Military Affairs), and is then routed for action within the Department of Defense. If the project deals primarily with arms control and its relation to military strategy, it will be routed to the Joint Staff (which supports the Joint Chiefs of Staff) for further handling within the Staff and for routing among the three service departments. If, however, it is a request for technical support, such as research on the control of outer space as an example, the Director of Defense Research

and Engineering (DDR&E) will receive initial routing. In either case, the other section will be kept informed of the nature and status of the project.

III. THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Projects received at the Joint Staff (from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, via ISA) dealing with disarmament are usually controlled by J-5 (Plans and Policies) or the Special Assistant for Arms Control (SAAC, formerly known as Special Assistant for Disarmament Affairs) with the other interested branches acting in a coordinate capacity. The staff of SAAC is the operational office for disarmament matters within the Joint Staff. It is responsible for the further routing and coordination of the disarmament papers in the individual services. In 1961 there were eight officers on the staff of SAAC (increased to eleven in 1962). Seven of these were of the rank of colonel/captain, with a major general/rear admiral as director.

IV. THE MILITARY SERVICES

The arms control functions of the services are handled by "action officers" who, in addition to preparing the position of their services on specific proposals and projects received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, keep the senior officers in their staffs advised of current disarmament developments, both domestic and international. The organizational status for each action officer is approximately the same. The Navy action officers, on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations

(OpNav), are a captain and lieutenant commander attached to the Political-Military Policy Division (OP-61) within the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans and Policy ((OP-06).

The section of the Army staff involved in the development of disarmament policy is located within the Policy Planning Branch of the International and Political Planning Division. The specific billet is titled Disarmament, United Nations and International Organization, and is usually occupied by a colonel or lieutenant colonel. The International and Political Planning Division is contained within the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations.

A similar organizational structure exists in the Air Force Staff. The officers responsible for disarmament policy in the Air Force (two lieutenant colonels and a senior civilian in 1961) are located within the Foreign Agreements Division, under the Deputy Director for Policy and Director of Military Plans and Programs.

Each action officer of the services has ready access to his division or branch head (major general/rear admiral), and is charged with the expeditious processing of disarmament papers through the staff functions of his service. The action officers remain in close contact with their counterparts in the other services, the Joint Staff, and in ISA. There is also effective liaison between the action officers of the military services and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (formerly the United States Disarmament Agency). This liaison is generally maintained with the military representatives who are assigned to the weapons evaluation and Control Bureau of the Agency.

V. RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING

Although the Department of Defense plays an important role in the formulation of disarmament policy, its most striking contribution to disarmament is in technical research. The extent of this contribution is examined in the following chapter, "Arms Control and Research." The Director of Defense Research and Engineering performs the following functions applicable to disarmament matters:

> . . . supervises all research and engineering activities in the Department of Defense . . . directs and supervises the activities of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) . . . consults with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on interaction of research and development and strategy . . . coordinates activities, as appropriate, with other agencies of the Department of Defense; and maintains liaison with appropriate research and development agencies outside of the Department of Defense.[2]

In matters pertaining to disarmament, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering performs a staff function of research coordination for DOD. Within the Department of Defense, the agency it calls upon most frequently for technical support of disarmament projects is the Advanced Research Projects Agency.

VI. THE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY

The Advanced Research Projects Agency is organized within the Department of Defense to conduct research for the Secretary of Defense.

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[2] Department of Defense, Brief of the Organization and Functions, Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Defense Staff Offices, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Agencies, Joint Service Schools, prepared by the Administrative Services Division, Office of Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, April 1961, p. 5.

The Agency is separate from the military services, but closely coordinated with them. The Agency is:

> . . . responsible for basic and applied research and development for such advanced projects as the Director of Defense Research and Engineering assigns. The Agency utilizes the services of the military departments, other government agencies, private industrial and public entities, individuals and educational or research institutions to perform its projects.[3]

Prior to 1959, the primary responsibility of ARPA was the military space program. When the responsibility for Project Vela was assigned to ARPA in that year, the military space programs were transferred to the military service departments. Project Vela is discussed in the following chapter. Under the supervision of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, ARPA works very closely with the Atomic Energy Commission and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and coordinates the activities of several private research institutions.

Despite the many criticisms of "Pentagonese" and stereotype characterizations of sterile military thought, there is no single dominant disarmament philosophy in the Department of Defense. From the practical standpoint, there are too many divergent interests within DOD for a theoretical position to encompass all the views on any one issue. The DOD has, since World War II, spread far beyond the confines of the military services to represent economists, scientists, and non-military strategists. The military establishment can effectively speak as one voice only through the Secretary of Defense.

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[3] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

No new agency can assume the technical and scientific disarmament research functions now carried by the Department of Defense. What is required is political leadership of the military research effort. This leadership must ultimately come from the White House, but the day-to-day policy guidance and initiative should originate with those who are close to the foreign policy-making process in the Department of State. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) has the opportunity to fulfill this function. Close collaboration between the Weapons Evaluation and Control Office and the Disarmament Advisory Staff in ACDA, and the arms control specialists in the Department of Defense, should alleviate many of the past shortcomings.

CHAPTER VII

ARMS CONTROL AND RESEARCH

This paper has attempted to indicate the fundamental shift in philosophy from that of disarmament, as historically conceived, to that of arms control. Modern arms control systems, seeking primarily to stabilize the international turmoil and to establish international inspection and control, should be realized as only a first step toward general and complete disarmament. Disarmament in the past has not usually been considered dependent upon a system of international inspection and verification, but most modern arms control schemes, to be effective, require an elaborate inspection system. There are many reasons for this, but essentially the emphasis on arms control and inspection results from the present international political situation and the amazing development of military science in the last twenty years.

An effective system of inspection compensates for the extreme reluctance of either of the two political "blocs" to disarm without effective safeguards, under the present conditions of international tension. It is intended, therefore, through a method of arms control, not necessarily to disarm but to superimpose an elaborate system of inspection upon the present international structure. Thus, the principal efforts of recent years, although not successful, have been directed toward what was once felt to be the area of most likely agreement between the Soviet Union and the Western powers: supervision of a ban on tests of nuclear devices. The limited applicability (within the true sense of disarmament) of these efforts, however worthwhile, should

be fully understood. A successful ban on nuclear tests is at the fringe of the disarmament issue. Even the more comprehensive arms control proposals do not adequately come to grips with the momentous political problem of what to do in the event of failure of the principal parties to uphold the system.

It was suggested earlier that most technical problems are eventually superseded by the larger political issues. This should not imply that technical problems are either minor or simple to solve. Any study of the research problems involved in an attempt to improve detection and identification devices for the control system of a test ban would dispel such a thought. But the essential fact still remains: the resolution of a technical problem does not in any way guarantee resolution of the political problem surrounding it.

This chapter deals primarily with some of the research endeavors in the United States currently being devoted to developing a system for the monitoring and control of a nuclear test ban treaty. Such research is complicated and expensive; despite some statements regarding the capabilities of the new Agency in the Department of State, it will not have research facilities of the magnitude of those now available in the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission, and it would be unrealistic to attempt to provide such facilities.[1]

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[1] The bill to establish a United States Disarmament Agency for World Peace and Security said the following about the research facilities of the Agency (Section 32): "The Director is authorized (1) to conduct and support research, development, and other studies of the types specified in the preceeding section through use of the Agency's own facilities, and (2) to use, with their consent, the facilities of

Because of the emphasis on control rather than the reduction of arms, there has been an extensive increase in the quantity of scientific research in the United States devoted to these measures, especially a test ban monitoring system. These endeavors include many sections of the executive branch that would not normally be considered as having a role in disarmament matters.

It has often been alleged that the negotiating positions of the United States Government prior to disarmament conferences have been inadequately prepared. Perhaps the most noteworthy of these hasty efforts was the U. S. position before the Conference of Experts in 1958 regarding the capability to detect and identify nuclear explosions. When the government was forced to revise its position in early 1959 because of the data received from the Hardtack II test, it became obvious that an extensive research program was required in order to determine just what was the expected capability for detecting and identifying nuclear tests. As a result, two panels were formed to study the problem and report to the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology. This marked the beginning of a new disarmament era in the United States Government: the era of intensified research effort into the technical problems of arms control. Perhaps the creation of the new

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other Government agencies or those of outside organizations. In carrying out his responsibilities under this Act the Director shall, to the extent feasible, make full use of available facilities, Government and private, and may construct such new laboratories as he deems necessary." United States Congress, House of Representatives, A Bill to Establish a United States Disarmament Agency for World Peace and Security, H.R. 7936, 87th Congress, 1st Session, June 29, 1961, pp. 8-9; hereafter cited as A Bill to Establish a Disarmament Agency.

disarmament agency will mark the beginning of a second era, the era of intensified research effort into the political problems of arms control.

The first of these two panels, which was officially known as the Panel on Seismic improvement and which had been formed by the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology at the request of the Department of State, produced a report on "The Need for Fundamental Research in Seismology." One of its basic recommendations was for ". . . a broad program to find ways for improving the detectability of seismic waves from explosions and earthquakes."[2]

The second panel, the Panel on High Altitude Detection, was given the responsibility to study methods of detection and identification of nuclear explosions in the atmosphere and in space. The reports from both panels were received by the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology in March, 1959. Although the Department of State had been instrumental in the formation of these panels, because it lacked research facilities it played little part in the development of what became known as Project Vela.[3]

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[2] United States Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Technical Aspects of Detection and Inspection Controls of a Nuclear Weapons Test Ban, Appendixes to Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Radiation and the Subcommittee on Research and Development, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, Part 2 of 2 Parts, April 19, 20, 21, and 22, 1960 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 652; hereafter cited as Technical Aspects of Detection.

[3] United States Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Developments in the Field of Detection and Identification of Nuclear Explosions (Project Vela) and Relationship to Test Ban Negotiations, Hearings, 87th Congress, 1st Session, July 25, 26, 27, 1961 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 9; hereafter cited as Developments in Detection and Identification.

The reports of these panels were widely studied and discussed within the government.[4] The story of the development of Project Vela from what appeared to be a modest beginning is best described by the testimony of Mr. Carlton M. Beyer, Deputy Assistant Director, Nuclear Test Detection Office, Advanced Research Projects Agency, before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy:

> The assignment of the Vela Project to the Department of Defense (DOD) resulted from a meeting on April 23, 1959 during which Dr. Killian, Special Assistant to the President on Science and Technology, Chairman McCone of the Atomic Energy Commission and Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles discussed the implementation of the reports from Panels on High Altitude Detection and Seismic Improvement. At this meeting, it was agreed that--
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> (a) The specific recommendations of both panels would be implemented.
> (b) The DOD would accept overall responsibility for implementing the high altitude panel recommendations with support from the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).
> (c) The DOD would accept primary responsibility for implementing the recommendations of the Seismic Improvement Panel but that the AEC would implement the nuclear and HE explosions in cooperation with the DOD.
>
> After a number of studies including those by advisory groups and activities within the DOD, the Secretary of Defense assigned the responsibility for the project, later named Vela, to the Advanced Research Projects Agency. The assignment is to "Perform research, experimentation and systems development to obtain at the earliest practicable date a system for the detection of nuclear explosions both underground and at high altitude."
>
> This assignment includes the following major technical objectives:
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> (a) Conduct research to better understand the nature of the nuclear detonation signals to be detected and how to discriminate them from other signals.

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[4] See the testimony of Mr. Carlton M. Beyer of the Department of Defense, Technical Aspects of Detection, p. 383.

> (b) Develop and evaluate existing and new techniques and instruments for detecting and identifying nuclear detonation signals.
>
> (c) Develop and evaluate systems for improving the detection and identification of nuclear detonations, and the problems involved in the operation of these systems.
>
> (d) Perform research, development, and evaluation of onsite inspection techniques.[5]

This list of major technical objectives gives some indication of the scope of Project Vela, which soon involved the participation of several governmental agencies, as well as many private universities, colleges, and research organizations. The magnitude and importance of the role played by non-governmental agencies involved in the research activities of Project Vela--as well as other projects in the field of arms control--is significant and worthy of separate study.

Project Vela was separated into three individual projects: Vela UNIFORM, Vela SIERRA, and Vela HOTEL. Vela UNIFORM is concerned with the detection and identification of underground and underwater nuclear explosions, and SIERRA and HOTEL are devoted to the detection of nuclear explosions in the atmosphere or in space. Vela SIERRA concerns ground-based equipment, and Vela HOTEL is involved with the detection of explosions in space by satellites.

The three basic projects (UNIFORM, SIERRA, and HOTEL) were further separated into many subdivisions in order to utilize existing facilities and to reduce the length of time required for Project Vela. Responsibility for the various segments was then "farmed out" to individual

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[5] Developments in Detection and Identification, p. 56. For additional treatment of the many agencies and organizations (including organizational charts) participating in Project Vela, see pp. 57-66.

agencies which either conducted the research or contracted with private organizations. The resulting framework of this research organization, all under the general supervision of the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense, was concisely described by Mr. Beyer:

> Regular guidance is received from the Office of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, and certain aspects of the Vela Project have been reviewed by the President's Scientific Advisory Committee. The U.S. Disarmament Administration in the Department of State has been kept informed of progress on the project through the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, by direct contact with ARPA and by direct contact with agents working on the project.
>
> The Atomic Energy Commission is active in all three programs of the Vela Project . . . . Within the Department of the Interior, the Geological Survey is participating through an increased crustal study program and is aiding in the planned series of research explosions . . . . The Department of Commerce, through the Coast and Geodetic Survey, is one of the numerous agencies assisting in the coordinated program of extensive measurements to be made in connection with the explosion program.
>
> The National Bureau of Standards gives major support in the Vela SIERRA Program. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration is participating in the joint AEC, NASA and DOD planning effort under the Vela HOTEL Program.[6]

This description, which includes only a portion of the governmental and private institutions engaged in Project Vela, demonstrates the magnitude of the research effort involved. The scope of the activity of private organizations should be emphasized; since there has been no central organization that could undertake by itself such a massive project, it has been necessary to spread the effort throughout

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[6] Developments in Detection and Identification, p. 57.

the educational and industrial communities as well as the government. For the entire project there have been well over one hundred separate contracts with university and industrial research centers, and under Vela UNIFORM alone, $80 million of the $92 million planned ". . . is to be attributed to industry and university activity."[7] Financially, Project Vela dwarfs the estimated cost of operating the (then) proposed Disarmament Agency for one year.[8] It is not sound to conclude from a comparison of operating costs that one program is more valuable than another, or that technical research excludes political research, but it is an indication of the extent to which the government has become committed to the concept of elaborate inspection and control systems.

Obviously, Project Vela is a gigantic scientific research enterprise. Its limited applicability to disarmament in the conventional sense should be underscored. Project Vela is not designed to disarm the United States or the Soviet Union, or both. Its purpose is to study the feasibility of the detection of nuclear explosions in various media and under various conditions, in order to assist the United States Government in the preparation of its positions in the test ban negotiations.

It should also be emphasized that Project Vela is thoroughly grounded upon an extensive system of international inspection, although the results of the project may eventually permit the size and scope of the system to be reduced. International inspection systems have been

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[7] Ibid., p. 60.

[8] Roughly estimated at $6 million for the first year, including administrative and research expenditures. See Report on S. 2180, p. 7.

anathema to the Soviets. The United States program to develop a technical inspectorate appears to be a unilateral effort, not matched by a known similar program in the Soviet Union. This matter was briefly raised during the hearings on Project Vela:

> Representative Van Zandt . . . . Do you know of any contribution in the way of knowledge that the Russians have made to the development of a program, with limited capabilities, of detecting tests, such as we have from some of our projects?
>
> Dr. Latter. I know of nothing directly, no, sir. The discussions which we have with the Soviets in Geneva have not suggested that they have made a great effort to learn about detection. They certainly are, many of them, excellent scientists and very knowledgeable in their respective fields.
>
> Representative Van Zandt. Is it proper to say that by their attitude they indicate they are not interested?
>
> Dr. Latter. Certainly. I mean there is every indication that the Soviets are minimizing the importance of control. I think this is a feeling I had consistently from the time of the Experts until today.[9]

Considering the limited disarmament applicability of the project, and the past hostility evidenced by the Soviets to international inspection and their apparent lack of interest in this type of research endeavor, it appears unusual that the orientation and emphasis of the disarmament research of the United States Government has not been more closely scrutinized. It is pertinent to question whether the decision to place overwhelming concentration of effort in the scientific aspects of arms control research has been a deliberate, conscious decision, or whether the United States has inadvertently chosen this line of research without careful consideration of other priorities that might be involved.

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[9] Developments in Detection and Identification, p. 27.

This writer is not competent to criticize the technical quality or the extent of present research for a system of international control. Undoubtedly, these programs should be continued on their present scales. Every possible avenue to international stability should be explored, including a test ban treaty. Nevertheless, the government should complement this research with similar effort in the legal, economic, and political fields.

CHAPTER VIII

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

For fifteen years after World War II the formulation of arms control policy was hampered by excessive decentralization and limited research support. Had disarmament been recognized in the government as a vital international issue rather than an irritant that was only reluctantly faced, these deficiencies might sooner have been overcome. Not all of the organizational problems could be eliminated, of course, but a degree of centralization combined with a thorough research program was indicated by the rather haphazard negotiations of the early and mid-1950's. It was not until 1960, however, that the disarmament personnel and functions within the office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Disarmament and Atomic Energy were transferred to a new unit called the U.S. Disarmament Administration. The establishment of the Disarmament Administration emphasized the recognition that: (1) disarmament policy requires extensive, continuing research not confined to the technical facilities of the DOD or the AEC; and (2) arms control policy, as an integral part of foreign policy, belongs under the direction and responsibility of the Secretary of State.

It soon became apparent, however, that the problems involved in making disarmament policy extended beyond any one agency of the government. Coordination of research efforts by a section within the Department of State was a noteworthy improvement, but the making of arms control policy required an organization that possessed more prestige within the Executive Branch than a subsidiary unit in the Department of

State. How to provide this prestige without creating an administrative "nightmare" was the dilemma that confronted the members of the Congress and officials in the Executive Branch who were attempting, in 1961, to write the legislation that would establish the Disarmament Agency for World Peace and Security.

The Agency proposed to the Congress represented the realization that disarmament can no longer be treated as an *ad hoc* affair. There must be an infusion of the thinking of all the departments concerned so that the many ramifications of disarmament policy can be dealt with at all levels of planning. Above all, considerably greater effort should now be devoted to the basic political, legal, and economic problems of disarmament and arms control that had previously been rather neglected.

The proposal for the Disarmament Agency recognized a few of the inadequacies of past efforts. There was to be more emphasis on the exchange of career personnel among the departments, with ample representation of other sections of the government on the Agency staff. Section 41 (c) authorized the Director of the Agency to:

> . . . enter into agreements with other Government agencies, including the military departments through the Secretary of Defense, under which officers or employees of such agencies may be detailed to the Agency for the performance of service pursuant to this Act without prejudice to the status or advancement of such officers or employees within their own agencies . . . .[1]

This was not an innovation or departure from past practices, but rather a recognition that the exchange of personnel has been beneficial and should be increased. It should be realized that the exchange of

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[1] *A Bill to Establish a Disarmament Agency*, p. 12.

personnel among the agencies in no way reduces the amount of cooperation and coordination required among agencies in the government. Career personnel attached to another agency for a regular tour are not representatives (officially) of their parent organization, but instead offer technical expertise peculiar to their profession so that policy papers may be more adequately prepared at all levels.

In an attempt to coordinate disarmament policy with military policy at an earlier stage in its development, Section 41 (f) of the proposed bill authorizes the Director to employ three retired military commissioned officers who are experts in military strategy or weapons systems.

Another past deficiency has been the quantity, quality, and continuity of research for disarmament. The extent of present efforts in the technical area of disarmament has been indicated in Chapter VII. One of the purposes of this paper has been to demonstrate the need, not to decrease our present technical research, but to devote more attention to the basic political and economic issues.

The Director of the proposed Agency would have ample discretion in establishing his internal organization, but the nature of the research and studies to be conducted or coordinated by the Agency is clearly defined in Section 31. Research was not to be considered limited to those subjects listed. Although relative importance of the research subjects is not indicated in the Act, it is significant to note that many of the highly important subjects that in the past have received scanty attention are lumped together in the next to last research function, which includes:

> (i) the scientific, economic, political, legal, social, psychological, military, and technological factors related to the prevention of war with a view to a better understanding of how the basic structure of a lasting peace may be established.

Another research area that requires concentration of effort is:

> (j) the national security and foreign policy implications of disarmament proposals with a view to a better understanding of the effect of such proposals upon national security and foreign policy;

Too often in the past, our disarmament and national security policies have been at odds.[2] This is a problem that calls for more than simply coordination of departmental activities.

A third area of past disarmament effort calling for remedy is that of public opinion. Section 35 of the Act describes public information as a function to be performed by the Director "with respect to the dissemination abroad of information concerning United States disarmament activities." This is presently being effected through the cooperation of the United States Information Agency and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. It is extremely difficult to measure the impact or success of such a program, but its need is generally accepted.

Not emphasized, however, was the need to increase the amount of information presented to the American people through the various media. In the past, disarmament may have been a relatively simple operation to effect *if* political agreement could be achieved. Today, the combination of the issues of national security and arms control and the related

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[2] Senator Humphrey cites two examples of this divergency of policy in "Government Organization for Arms Control," Donald G. Brennan (ed.), *Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security* (New York: George Braziller, 1961), pp. 400-1.

political problems is too complicated to call for a simple "yes" or "no" public response.[3] Effective propaganda both at home and abroad on disarmament issues requires a prior formulation of basic goals, however, and U.S. organizational ability to determine these goals has been limited.

Cooperation and coordination with other governmental agencies has already been discussed in terms of exchange of personnel, and the need for increased coordination of disarmament and military policies has been noted. In several places the Act provides for and requires intensified effort on the part of the Director of the Disarmament Agency to establish more effective coordination, not only in policy formation but in research and other functions. In Section 31 the Director is:

> . . . authorized and directed to coordinate the research, development, and other studies conducted in this field by or for other Government agencies in accordance with procedures established under Section 37 . . . ,

which directs the Agency Director to:

> . . . develop suitable procedures to assure cooperation, coordination, and a continuing exchange of information among affected Government agencies on all significant aspects of United States disarmament policy and related matters . . .

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[3] For an illuminating discussion of this subject, see Ithiel de Sola Pool, "Public Opinion and the Control of Armaments," Brennan, op. cit., pp. 333-346. Mr. Pool is a strong advocate of arms control vice disarmament, in the conventional sense. He is critical of U.S. acceptance of Soviet terminology and criteria, such as "Peaceful coexistence," "reduced tensions" resulting from disarmament, and other similar concepts, and Pool calls instead for the education of the American people of the need for, and the cost of, arms control. He also suggests a propaganda drive for arms control "to open up Soviet society," stressing the role that public opinion plays even in the Soviet Union.

The new Disarmament Agency is not visualized as a superbureaucracy, although most governmental agencies have an inherent ability to flourish. If the Agency is compared with our disarmament efforts of just a few years ago, when only a handful of full-time personnel expended annually a mere few hundred thousand dollars, the proposed Agency takes on added depth. The staff of the present Disarmament Administration has estimated that:

> . . . a new agency would require approximately 250 people in the first year, including all the categories of personnel already described as well as administrative staff for such services as the new Agency would provide for itself. Most of the Agency's administrative services will be supplied by the State Department. The Agency would require approximately 3 million dollars annually for salaries and administrative services.
>
> At the beginning, the Agency should contract out much of its scientific research work. If it acquired laboratory facilities of its own, however, additional personnel would of course, be necessary. An estimate of the funds which will be necessary for research, study and other contract authority for the first year is $3 million. Developments in the field of negotiations, however, may drastically change even the most careful estimate.[4]

It is expected that the Agency would be organized internally like the present Disarmament Administration, modified in accordance with the desires of the Director and his immediate staff. Only an Office of Public Affairs and an Office of the General Counsel would be established by statute (Sec. 25). The responsibilities of the Director for conducting research and establishing research facilities have been mentioned. The Director is responsible for preparing recommended United States

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[4] Appendix C to Report on S. 2180, Creating a United States Disarmament Agency for World Peace and Security, /n.d./ p. 7, prepared by the Office of the Adviser to the President on Disarmament.

disarmament policy ". . . for the President, the Secretary of State, and the heads of such other Government agencies as the President may determine . . ." (Sec. 33). Authorization is provided in Section 34 for the Director, under the direction of the Secretary of State, to

> consult and communicate with or direct the consultation and communication with representatives of other nations or of international organizations for the purpose of conducting negotiations concerning disarmament or for the purpose of exercising any other authority given to the Director by this Act; and (b) communicate in the name of the Secretary with diplomatic representatives of the United States in this country and abroad.

One of the more significant provisions of the Act (Sec. 26) is the establishment of a General Advisory Committee (modeled after a similar organization at the Atomic Energy Commission) ". . . to advise the Director on disarmament policy and activities." The Committee, with a maximum of fifteen members, would be appointed by the President and would be constituted, it appears, on an *ad hoc* basis for the individual members, or consultants. These consultants would be reimbursed for their services at $100 per diem, plus travel expenses, "while away from their homes or regular places of business." Their contracts may be renewed annually.

If such a body were permanently constituted on a full-time basis, with representation afforded to the economic, legal, military, and other interested communities, the Advisory Committee might become *the* organization capable of formulating the basic disarmament objectives upon which policy and negotiating positions can be based. Under the proposed circumstances, the General Advisory Committee would probably tend to become another "panel of experts" adept at producing vague generalities, not sufficiently responsible to serve as a foundation for national policy.

Hearings on the proposed Disarmament Agency were conducted by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in August, 1961. A study of the testimony taken at these hearings results in several conclusions, some of which are encouraging for the future of U.S. disarmament negotiations and others that are not so encouraging.

Most of the favorable results may be condensed into two basic conclusions: (1) disarmament, because it is so highly complex, requires an enormous amount of research (research effort in recent years is now recognized as having been somewhat superficial, hastily-conceived, and excessively concentrated on technical problems); and (2) disarmament policy is a part of foreign policy, and the Director of the proposed Agency should come under the immediate direction of the Secretary of State, but in order to have individual stature, the Director must have ultimate access to the President.

A preponderance of witnesses testified in support of these favorable conclusions that may seem almost self-evident now, yet have not received sufficient recognition in the past.

Disheartening, however, was the lack of testimony bearing upon two other vital areas:

1. The need for a group, committee, or section within the Agency composed of highly qualified, senior officials who can address themselves full time to the difficult political problems of disarmament.

2. The need for an interdepartmental group that can bring the views of Defense, Atomic Energy, and other executive activities along

with State to bear on these problems. This must be more than a coordinating body to be effective.

These four issues require some clarification. Most witnesses testified strongly regarding the pressing need for extensive research. There was little dissension from this point of view. Most often, research was considered necessary in technical areas to support disarmament delegations, so that they could be better prepared in their negotiations. Few persons are better qualified to testify regarding this need for thorough advance preparation in support of negotiations than Frederick M. Eaton, who headed the U.S. delegation in the Ten-Nation Disarmament negotiations:

> Too much stress cannot be placed on the importance of research and studies in the area of disarmament. A year ago, and I doubt that the situation has changed today, the lack of adequate backup papers to support our positions was one of our greatest failing. Their absence leaves any U.S. delegation in a very insecure and uncertain position. Although in every disarmament plan advanced over the past 10 years we have proposed a gradual reduction of arms, we have never had an acceptable program as to what weapons should be scrapped, let alone an agreement with our allies in this area. The same failure exists as to the definition of what constitutes forces to be reduced. We have never had adequate support papers on our proposal for the monitoring of weapons in outer space, the launching of missiles, the monitoring of the production of plants producing fissionable materials, although we have strenuously advanced the position that we would be willing to stop production of fissionable materials for military purposes. I use these only as examples of the necessity of giving to this Agency the authority to direct and coordinate studies and research in these areas, and where necessary, to conduct such on its own.[5]

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[5] United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Disarmament Agency, Hearings on S. 2180, A Bill to Establish a United States Disarmament Agency for World Peace and Security, 87th Congress, 1st Session, August 14, 15, and 16, 1961 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 152; hereafter cited as Senate Hearings on Disarmament Agency.

In his statements before the Senate and House Committees, John J. McCloy included similar comments on the need for research. However, Mr. McCloy was more specific than most other witnesses on the subject of additional research on political questions. After noting the continued need for research on technical questions, he stressed the requirement for thorough study of the ". . . basic political questions concerning the maintenance of peace and security under various levels of disarmament."[6] Perhaps this indicates an increased effort in the future to study these vital political questions that have been rather lightly treated in the past.

There was doubt regarding the organizational structure for this research endeavor, a fear that the intensive research activities of other agencies such as DOD and the AEC would merely be duplicated in the new Agency. There also was the anticipation that the research activities of the proposed Agency would replace those currently conducted by other departments. This misunderstanding is best exemplified by an exchange between two members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee during hearings:

> Mr. Zablocki . . . . Do you know, Mr. Chairman, that the White House has a Special Adviser to the President on Disarmament with nine staff members.
>
> The State Department in the U.S. Disarmament Administration has 52 personnel and the Science Adviser to the Secretary has 12. The National Security Council has 24. The Department of Defense has a Special Assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Arms Control, who has 12. The Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs and Assistant Secretary for International

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[6] *Ibid.*, p. 65.

> Security are two more. The Director for Disarmament, Department of Defense, has seven. The Advanced Research Projects Agency has 18. The Atomic Energy Commission has 194 for a total of 330.
>
> The Disarmament Agency is not a new venture and an initial step in disarmament. My constituents are questioning whether this agency is really going to consolidate, coordinate, or duplicate. . . .
>
> Mr. Hays. . . . that is exactly what the bill proposes to do, is get all these people together under one agency so we can know what they are doing.
>
> Mr. Zablocki. On the contrary, it does not.[7]

This writer would have to agree with Mr. Zablocki that research would not be gathered under one agency. The transfer of research facilities from Defense and Atomic Energy to the new Agency to conduct tests for detection, for example, would entail tremendous expenditures, as would the transfer of space control research from the NASA, as another example. A much more reasonable solution would be to conduct joint theoretical research with the other department concerned performing the tests under the supervision of the Agency.

There was little comment on section 47 of the proposed bill (Presidential authority to transfer certain functions). For these certain functions to be transferred from any government agency to the Disarmament Agency, they must relate primarily to disarmament. After

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[7] United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, To Establish a United States Arms Control Agency, Hearings on H.R. 7936 and H.R. 9118, 87th Congress, 1st Session, August 24, 25, 28, and September 7, 1961 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 58. This report is hereafter cited as House Hearings on Arms Control Agency. Also see this report, pp. 34-36, for the testimony of Commissioner Leland J. Haworth of the Atomic Energy Commission on the possibility of research duplication.

questioning the wording of this section, former Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates, Jr., added that

> The word "function" is very broad, and I think it would be more satisfactory to have the transfer authority follow the normal Executive order procedure.[8]

The second basic conclusion mentioned earlier concerned the recognition that the Director of the Disarmament Agency should be under the direction of the Secretary of State, yet have access to the President. There was considerable comment on this "dual allegiance" concept, especially in the Senate hearings, and on the means available to provide coordination under this new system.

From the organizational standpoint, having the Director in this position is not advantageous. Senator Symington stated this concisely, when questioning Secretary Rusk:

> How can a man be under the direction of the Secretary and, at the same time, under the direction of the President?
>
> Secretary Rusk. (After discussing the peculiar needs of disarmament) . . . I do not believe that it would be proper to say that any officer of the Government who reports to a Cabinet officer and to the President is reporting to two hats because the Cabinet officer reports to the President, and this is a matter of insuring that proposals in this important field have the full examination of the Secretary of State.[9]
>
> Obviously not satisfied, Senator Symington continued:
>
> I ask, with great respect, would the head of this new Agency report to you, or does he report to the President?
>
> Secretary Rusk . . . . To the Secretary of State and the President. I do not think, sir, I can give you another answer because that is the proposal.[10]

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[8] Senate Hearings on Disarmament Agency, op. cit., p. 144.

[9] Ibid., p. 33.

[10] Ibid., p. 34.

Not only was the relationship of the Director to the Secretary of State a matter of confusion, but the problem of interdepartmental coordination was left largely unanswered. There was occasional mention of the functions of the Committee of Principals[11] and the National Security Council,[12] but no thorough discussion of this issue.

The absence in the hearings of extensive testimony on the proposed methods of formulating disarmament policy has been mentioned. The need for a new approach to the political problems of disarmament also has been treated previously. Broad political policy should be formulated in the new Agency, with the active participation of other agencies in each stage. The General Advisory Committee could perform this function in the Agency if it were a permanent structure, and the Committee of Principals could serve as the interdepartmental group to formulate basic disarmament policy, but such functions were not spelled out in the proposed bill or in the testimony received. This unresolved problem was lucidly presented in the testimony of Commissioner Haworth:

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[11] Senate Hearings on Disarmament Agency, op. cit., pp. 34, 79-80, and 92. There was little agreement on the functions of the Committee of Principals. Commissioner Leland J. Haworth of the Atomic Energy Commission noted (p. 92) that ". . . . As you know the present policy-formation process involves a committee of the heads of affected agencies--the Committee of Principals--that meets under the leadership of State to discuss and arrive at a consensus on policy measures. We hope the provisions of this bill will be interpreted to provide for some such continuing participation in policy formation at all levels by affected and responsible agencies, with the U.S. Disarmament Agency as the central coordinating policy group." Most references to the Committee of Principals, however, do not attribute policy making to that body. Mr. McCloy had previously commented (p. 80) that "It is only when you have a difference of view, when you have a situation where you have to compose varying points of view that you call in the Committee of Principals."

[12] See ibid., pp. 76-78, for testimony of General Lemnitzer on the

> I should like to speak briefly about the process of making policy on disarmament within the administration. The important policy decisions must, of course, be made by the President. In making these decisions he must act on the basis of various, sometimes conflicting, considerations of a technical, political, and national security nature. It is clearly necessary that there be some central group working purposefully in the development of policy recommendations, but other agencies have special degrees of competence in various areas bearing on disarmament. An important provision of the bill is that such agencies be brought into policy formation at stages.[13]

The Disarmament Agency proposed in 1961 presented a vast improvement in the conduct and coordination of technical research, but at the same time failed to provide a vehicle for the resolution of basic political questions. The practices and attitudes of the President and his principal advisers, which in the long run are of much more importance than organizational structure, could overcome this deficiency.

There is no significant difference between the proposed bill and the Act establishing the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.[14] In the successful legislation, Congress indicated its hesitancy to accept the priority of disarmament over arms control by revising the entire bill, including the title of the Agency, so that arms control received precedence.[15]

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anticipated role of the National Security Council in future disarmament matters.

[13] House Hearings on Arms Control Agency, pp. 34-35.

[14] Public Law 87-297, 75Stat.631 (1961).

[15] Section 33 of the Act grants the Director authority to prepare arms control policy recommendations for the President, Secretary of State, and others, but Congress retained its voice in ultimate arms control decisions by requiring that any arms control agreements with other countries be submitted to the Congress according to the ". . . treaty

The unusual, dual responsibility of the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) to the President as well as the Secretary of State was retained in the Act. The Director is responsible (Section 2) to the President, the Secretary of State, other members of the Executive Branch, and Congress for disarmament and arms control policy recommendations, and an evaluation of the effect of these recommendations on foreign policy, national security policy, and the economy. Sections 22 and 33 designate the Director as the principal arms control and disarmament adviser to the President and the Secretary of State. Section 22 also grants the Director *primary responsibility within the government* (italics supplied) for arms control and disarmament matters. The Director of the Agency also is responsible to the Secretary of State for the internal organization of the Agency (Section 25) and for arms control negotiations and related functions (Section 34). These are matters that pertain primarily to the work of the Department of State.

One reason for the establishment of the ACDA was to create an agency with a certain amount of independence and prestige. Sincere, astute negotiations for disarmament--based upon thorough research and preparation of negotiating positions--can bring international prestige to the United States and the Agency. Prestige of a different nature has also been considered a requisite for the new Agency, and that is domestic prestige resulting from the primary position of the Agency in the

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making power of the President under the Constitution or unless authorized by further affirmative legislation by the Congress of the United States."

government for the consideration of arms control matters. In its coordination of the disarmament programs within the governmental organization, the Agency must have primary authority if it is to be effective. For this reason, at least in part, the Director was made responsible to the President areas. For example, under Section 35 the President is asked to establish procedures for the coordination of the several agencies of the Executive Branch, and is requested to resolve any differences that may arise between the governmental agencies. In addition, the President is authorized to transfer the disarmament activities of other agencies to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The bill establishing the ACDA specified a portion of the organizational structure of the Agency. In addition to the Director, the Congress provided for a Deputy Director (Section 23) and a maximum of four Assistant Directors (Section 24) to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. A General Advisory Committee was established by the statute, which required the Committee to meet at least twice each year (Section 26). The lower echelons of organization were left to discretion of the Director, under the direction of the Secretary of State, except for an Office of the General Counsel. This last position would be responsible for the legal implications of an arms control treaty, as well as other functions.

In accordance with the authority to set up the internal organization of the Agency, several bureaus and divisions have been formed. The Public Affairs Advisor, the Secretariat, and the Executive Staff are self-explanatory. Research in the ACDA is provided by five offices, or bureaus. The Reference Research Staff conducts historical research and

provides the required reference support for the other offices and activities of the Agency. Personnel and management services are handled by the Executive Staff.

The remaining research activities include:[16]

> (1) International Relations Office--charged with conducting political research, developing negotiating positions in coordination with the other offices of the Agency, and supplying support personnel for international negotiations.
>
> (2) Economic Office--responsible for the economic research related to arms control and disarmament measures.
>
> (3) Science and Technology Office--Provides the scientific research required to support the formulation of policy.
>
> (4) Weapons Evaluation and Control Office--researches the effect of weapons systems and employment of forces upon international stability.

The key unit for the research and policy-making activities of the Agency is the Disarmament Advisory Staff. This is probably the most important section of the Agency, other than the top echelon. The Disarmament Advisory Staff (DAS) is responsible for the formulation of disarmament policy recommendations, developed from the research produced by the four research offices just discussed. The DAS coordinates not only the internal functioning of the Agency but also ". . . maintains liaison with the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State and with other Government agencies concerned with disarmament in order to establish agreed arms control and disarmament positions."[17] Also, the

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[16] United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Organization and Functions [n.d.], p. 2.

[17] Ibid., p. 2. For an additional view of the early organizational structure of the ACDA, see U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, First Annual Report of the U.S. Arms

DAS consults with the General Advisory Committee during the process of disarmament and arms control policy formulation.

Control and Disarmament Agency, 87th Congress, 2d Session, Document No. 326, February 1, 1962 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 3-4.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS

It would not be too difficult to criticize the disarmament endeavors of the United States over the past sixteen years. Some authors who write in this field concentrate their attention in this direction. This is not only an unreasonable approach, it is also unproductive. In the same manner that disarmament policy must be considered as an integral part of national security policy, disarmament efforts must be judged relative to world conditions, public attitudes in the United States, and previous disarmament history. If the United States disarmament program is evaluated in a vacuum, it can only be found a failure.

Until quite recently, disarmament has not been as pressing an issue in the United States as in many other countries. This is especially true of the European nations that have been torn apart by two world wars, and see little chance even for survival in a third such holocaust. In Western Europe, whether viewed as a panacea or merely a dim hope for a more rational international order, disarmament has been a foremost subject for political discussion for decades. Perhaps there was much more encouragement for disarmament in the Europe of a half century ago, when there were several states of relatively equal power, all of which might benefit by proportionate disarmament, assuming that political agreement could be achieved. If by chance one nation turned out to be a loser through the disarmament agreement, there was at least "room for maneuver" for the loser to recoup his loss in the international

chess game: alliances could be juggled, or new colonies developed, or the economic base could be strengthened. Today, we have frozen ourselves into a sterile division of power blocs that permits the least amount of adjustment.

The United States only recently has become a powerful world leader within this arena of limited political maneuvering. In addition, the United States has not suffered military devastation as has Europe. For these and other reasons, disarmament as a goal has not been too well received in governmental--and private--circles in the United States until recent years. Disarmament has been an unwanted stepchild in the United States Government; it has not been able to claim a "disciple" in this country of the stature of Noel-Baker in Great Britain or Moch in France. Disarmament also has not been grasped as a valid political weapon by either of the American political parties, as compared to the emphasis the labor and socialist parties of Western Europe place upon this issue. This lack of public clamor for some degree of arms limitation has probably been a dominant factor in the failure of the United States to produce, until quite recently, a corps of disarmament experts or assemblage of expertise, or a continuity of purpose and expression to its disarmament philosophy.

The outlook regarding the organization of the government for disarmament has been improving just as the prospects for effective agreement with the U.S.S.R. appear to be diminishing. Nevertheless, the attempt to establish a more effective governmental apparatus for developing disarmament policy must continue, just as the search for successful and secure disarmament must continue.

The problem and the demands involved in this task were lucidly presented to the Senate in June, 1961, by Senator Humphrey:

> Disarmament is not merely a matter for diplomats at a negotiating table; it is a subject for scientists and technicians also. Let that be clear. Disarmament that involves modern weapons will require an intricate system of inspection and international controls requiring the most sophisticated electronic, accoustical, magnetic, and other scientific devices.
>
> Disarmament brings into full focus the interrelationship and the interdependency of diplomacy and science. Therefore, our preparations must be continuous, constant, up to date, and ever more reliable. Therefore, disarmament is a demanding task. Disarmament is full-time work. It cannot be undertaken by half-hearted, part-time efforts.
>
> . . . . We must have the finest minds, and we must have complete and total preparation. I submit that throughout the years this has not been the case. All too often we have gone to disarmament conferences poorly prepared technically, without an adequate position of our own or our allies, and uncertain as to our objectives, and even more uncertain as to the procedures to be followed.[1]

Whether the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency answers these criticisms is a different matter. At least the Agency might present a much greater opportunity than in the past for the United States to become an effective leader for international arms control.

The United States has not always stated its disarmament position with clarity, foresight, and consistency. Although the principal thesis of this paper is that governmental organization has not always been conducive to the development of the basic disarmament decisions required for consistent, realistic policy, it must be recognized that no new

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[1] Address to the Senate by Senator Humphrey in introducing the bill to establish a United States Disarmament Agency for World Peace and Security. Congressional Record, June 29, 1961, 87th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. CVII, pp. 10848-10849.

organization by itself is going to produce the desired results. The collective, governmental attitude combined with strong leadership will be decisive in future endeavors. It is obvious that much of the world looks to the government of the United States for increased and sustained endeavor directed toward effective, comprehensive disarmament.

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX I

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION FOR DISARMAMENT

Appendix I

PRESIDENT
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
SP AST SC & TECH
SP AST NSC
STATE
SECRETARY
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
DIRECTOR
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
~~COUNCIL~~ GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE
PUBLIC AFFAIRS ADVISOR
SECRETARIAT
DISARMAMENT ADVISORY STAFF
EXECUTIVE STAFF
WEAPONS EVAL AND CONTROL BUREAU
ECONOMIC BUREAU
INTERNAT'L RELATIONS BUREAU
SCIENTIFIC & TECHNICAL BUREAU
CIA
DIRECTOR
AEC
CHAIRMAN
SPECIAL OPERATIONS
MILITARY APPLICATIONS
DEFENSE
SECRETARY
DEPUTY SECRETARY
DDR&E
SPECIAL ASST ARMS CONTROL
AST SECY ATOMIC ENERGY
ASST SECY ISA
DEP SECY ARMS CONTROL
DIR OF DISARMAMENT
STAFF
CHAIRMAN JCS
SP AST ARMS CONTROL
STAFF
NAVY
PLANS & POLICY
POL MIL POLICY
ARMS CONTROL
MARINE CORPS
G3
STR PLANS
DISARMAMENT
ARMY
MILITARY OPS
STR PLN & POLCY
ARMS CONTROL
AIR FORCE
PLNS & PRGMS
PLNS FOR POLCY
DISARMAMENT

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